Federal Judicial Balance and Accountability Act¶
Evaluation Against the Epps-Sitaraman Framework¶
Introduction¶
In 2019, Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman published "How to Save the Supreme Court" in the Yale Law Journal, offering both a diagnostic framework for the Court's legitimacy crisis and two structural reform proposals -- the Supreme Court Lottery and the Balanced Bench. Their article is among the most analytically rigorous prescriptive contributions to the Supreme Court reform literature, and it provides a particularly useful benchmark for evaluating the Federal Judicial Balance and Accountability Act (FJBAA), hereafter "the Act," because it does what the 2021 Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States declined to do: it proposes, defends, and stress-tests specific reform architectures.
This evaluation proceeds in four parts. Part I assesses how the Act performs against the three reform criteria and three substantive goals Epps and Sitaraman establish. Part II examines their critique of five existing reform categories -- term limits, panels, court-packing, jurisdiction stripping, and Senate-based reform -- and shows how the Act addresses the weaknesses they identify in each. Part III evaluates the Act against their two original proposals, identifying where the Act's integrated architecture avoids structural weaknesses present in the Lottery and the Balanced Bench. Part IV identifies areas of convergence and productive disagreement between the two frameworks.
The evaluation engages the strongest versions of Epps and Sitaraman's arguments. Where the Act departs from their framework, this document explains why. Where their analysis identifies genuine concerns that the Act must address, those concerns are acknowledged.
Part I: The Act Against the Epps-Sitaraman Criteria¶
Epps and Sitaraman establish three criteria any successful reform must satisfy, and three substantive goals the resulting system should achieve. This Part evaluates the Act against each.
The Three Reform Criteria¶
1. Constitutional plausibility and statutory implementability. Epps and Sitaraman argue that reform must be implementable by statute rather than constitutional amendment, given the near-impossibility of amendment in a polarized era. They accept that constitutional arguments need not be "bulletproof" -- plausibility suffices, especially when the alternative to moderate reform is more radical action like court-packing or jurisdiction stripping.
The Act satisfies this criterion. Its Legal Analysis provides detailed constitutional grounding for each major provision. The three-phase career structure rests on Akhil Reed Amar's distinction between regulating judicial duties and terminating judicial tenure -- a framework that draws on the demonstrated practice of justices transitioning to hearing cases on lower courts under existing statutory authority (28 U.S.C. Section 371). Circuit reorganization and Court expansion operate under Congress's established Article III organizational authority, exercised seven times in American history. The slate-based nomination and Bloc STAR voting provisions operate under Necessary and Proper Clause authority to structure advice and consent, following precedent from budget reconciliation, the Trade Promotion Authority, and the War Powers Resolution. The ethics provisions regulate conduct rather than tenure, imposing sanctions that change duty assignments while preserving Article III protections.
The Act's constitutional theory is at least as plausible as either of Epps and Sitaraman's own proposals -- and arguably more conservative. The Supreme Court Lottery requires accepting that approximately 180 appellate judges can simultaneously hold the office of Supreme Court justice, that the Court can sit in randomly selected panels, and that a supermajority requirement for striking down statutes is constitutionally permissible. The Balanced Bench requires accepting that the Appointments Clause permits justices to select their own colleagues and that explicit partisan-balance requirements are constitutional. Each of these propositions faces significant objections that Epps and Sitaraman acknowledge. The Act's provisions, by contrast, operate closer to established constitutional ground: Congress has changed Court size before, has reorganized circuits repeatedly, has structured Senate procedures through legislation for decades, and has regulated judicial duties without terminating tenure through the existing senior status framework.
2. Stable equilibrium. Epps and Sitaraman argue that reform must be capable of producing a system both parties can live with going forward, even if initially enacted through partisan means. Drawing on David Pozen's concept of "anti-hardball" -- using aggressive tactics to accomplish structurally neutral goals -- they contend that the resulting system must reflect rules both sides would prefer under a veil of ignorance.
The Act satisfies this criterion through its principled-derivation design philosophy. Court size is tied to circuit count, which is derived from population equity mathematics -- not from partisan calculation. Appointment equalization guarantees each presidential term exactly five appointment opportunities regardless of party. The moving-average effect ensures the Court's ideological composition reflects whichever party wins more elections over time, without locking in any particular configuration. No party gains a structural advantage from the Act's architecture.
This is a stronger equilibrium foundation than either of Epps and Sitaraman's proposals provides. The Supreme Court Lottery's stability depends on both parties accepting a radically different institutional form -- a Court without permanent membership -- which either party could repeal by simple statute when it controls unified government. The Balanced Bench's stability depends on both parties accepting permanent 5-5 parity regardless of electoral outcomes, which a party enjoying sustained electoral dominance would have strong incentive to reject. The Act's stability derives from mathematical neutrality: the system produces fair outcomes for any party configuration, making repeal irrational for any party that expects to sometimes win and sometimes lose.
3. Depoliticization. Epps and Sitaraman frame this as the overarching goal: reform should make the Court less of a partisan institution, or at least make partisan capture structurally more difficult. They emphasize that depoliticization requires both reducing the stakes of individual appointments and structuring the system so political actors cannot stack the Court with ideological allies.
The Act addresses both dimensions. The fifteen-justice Court means any single appointment carries roughly forty percent less constitutional leverage than on a nine-justice Court -- eight votes rather than five are needed for a majority, diluting the impact of each nomination. Biennial appointments with equalization normalize the process into a predictable rhythm rather than a high-stakes crisis triggered by death or strategic retirement. The three-phase career structure decouples transitions from mortality: every justice transitions to Senior Justice status on schedule, and Senior Justices cover unexpected vacancies through lottery rotation, so no individual justice's health or longevity determines constitutional outcomes. And the slate-based nomination with Bloc STAR voting transforms the confirmation process from adversarial gatekeeping into collaborative selection, structurally favoring broadly acceptable nominees over narrowly partisan ones through the mathematics of scored aggregation.
The Act does not, however, pursue one of Epps and Sitaraman's depoliticization strategies: explicitly encoding non-partisanship into the Court's composition. Both the Lottery (with its cap on same-party appointees per panel) and the Balanced Bench (with its 5-5 partisan parity) build partisan identity directly into the Court's structure. The Act achieves ideological moderation through structural consequences -- the moving-average effect, the dilution of individual appointments, the scored-voting dynamic -- without ever mentioning parties. This is a deliberate design choice grounded in the judgment that encoding partisan identity into a judicial institution undermines the very perception of non-partisanship the reform is supposed to create.
The Three Substantive Goals¶
1. Preserve the Court as a non-partisan institution. As discussed above, the Act achieves this through structural mechanisms rather than explicit partisan-balance requirements. The moving-average effect is the principal mechanism: biennial turnover on a fifteen-seat Court ensures the bench continuously reflects the accumulated judgment of recent elections rather than the accumulated accidents of mortality. This was discovered as an emergent property of principled design, not engineered as an explicit goal -- a point the Act's Emergent Benefits of Principled Design document develops at length.
2. Reduce the stakes of individual nominations. The Act reduces nomination stakes through multiple reinforcing mechanisms: a larger Court dilutes each appointment's impact; predictable scheduling eliminates the crisis atmosphere of unexpected vacancies; slate-based nomination ensures no single nominee's fate determines constitutional outcomes; and the three-phase career structure means no justice exercises peak power for more than twelve years. Epps and Sitaraman's concern about "cults of personality" around individual justices is addressed by the fifteen-justice Court (which distributes public attention across more individuals), the Co-Chief Justice rotation (which prevents any single justice from accumulating decades of concentrated administrative power), and the biennial cadence of appointments (which normalizes turnover as routine rather than epochal).
3. Nudge toward deference to political branches. This is where the Act diverges from Epps and Sitaraman most directly. Both of their proposals include a supermajority requirement (6-3) for striking down federal statutes -- an explicit constraint on substantive judicial power designed to push the Court toward deference. The Act includes no such provision. Its design philosophy focuses on who sits and how they get there, not on what the Court can do once constituted. The Act constrains the structural conditions that produce partisan capture; Epps and Sitaraman additionally constrain the Court's substantive authority.
This divergence reflects a principled scope choice. The Act addresses structural dysfunction -- actuarial randomness, circuit imbalance, norm-dependent processes, confirmation pathology, ethics gaps, concentrated power -- without prescribing how the resulting Court should exercise its constitutional authority. A supermajority requirement would cross from structural reform into substantive constraint on judicial review, a line the Act deliberately does not cross.
Part II: Existing Proposals and Their Weaknesses¶
Epps and Sitaraman evaluate five categories of existing reform proposals and find each wanting. This Part examines whether the Act addresses the specific weaknesses they identify.
Term Limits¶
Epps and Sitaraman are notably skeptical of eighteen-year term limits, identifying two principal concerns. First, guaranteed biennial appointments would make the Court a campaign issue in every election cycle, increasing rather than decreasing politicization. Second, term-limited justices might treat the Court as a springboard for post-service careers, deciding cases with an eye toward future employment on cable news, in lobbying, or in electoral politics.
The Act addresses both concerns. On the first, the Act accepts that predictable appointments will carry political salience but argues this is preferable to the current system's actuarial randomness. The key is that the slate-based nomination with Bloc STAR voting absorbs the political energy by channeling it into a collaborative selection process rather than an adversarial confirmation battle. Politicization of appointment timing is less corrosive when the confirmation mechanism itself structurally favors broadly acceptable nominees.
On the second, the Act's three-phase career structure eliminates the post-service incentive problem entirely. Justices do not leave the bench after twelve years of active service; they transition to Senior Justice status with full Article III tenure, salary, and continued judicial duties. There is no "post-Court career" to angle for because there is no departure from the judiciary. The Senior Justice phase includes vacancy coverage rotation, circuit court service by designation, and Ethics Review Panel membership (when not currently assigned to vacancy coverage rotation) -- meaningful institutional roles that preserve both judicial identity and professional engagement. This is a fundamentally different answer than any eighteen-year proposal provides, where post-term service is typically an afterthought rather than a structurally necessary career phase.
Panels¶
Epps and Sitaraman briefly discuss the George and Guthrie proposal to expand the Court to appellate-court size with panel-based decision-making. They note the risk that the Court would simply take all politically charged cases en banc, eliminating any depoliticization benefit, and that expansion-phase appointments would remain highly contested.
The Act does not use panels for its regular decision-making. All fifteen active justices hear cases together, preserving the institutional coherence of a single, identifiable Supreme Court. The Act does employ panel-like structures in two limited contexts: the Ethics Review Panel (composed of Senior Justices) and the Bridge Panel (providing supplemental capacity during transition and for recusal gaps). These are functionally distinct from the panel proposals Epps and Sitaraman evaluate because they address specific operational needs rather than attempting to depoliticize the Court's core adjudicative function.
Court-Packing¶
Epps and Sitaraman acknowledge court-packing's constitutional soundness but worry about the "no stopping principle" -- that partisan expansion invites counter-expansion in an escalating spiral. They note that stability requires either sustained one-party dominance (to entrench the new equilibrium) or a structural feature that forecloses further manipulation.
The Act provides exactly the structural feature Epps and Sitaraman identify as necessary. Circuit-aligned composition -- one Associate Justice per regional circuit, with the circuit count derived from population equity mathematics -- establishes a principled ceiling on Court size that transcends partisan calculation. The fifteen-justice Court is not an arbitrary number chosen for political advantage; it is the mathematically derived consequence of organizing approximately equal-population circuits across the current U.S. demographic landscape. Any party seeking further expansion would need to justify additional circuits on population-equity grounds, not political convenience. The Act thus provides the "stopping principle" that court-packing lacks and that Epps and Sitaraman correctly identify as essential to stability.
This is arguably the Act's most significant structural advantage over every proposal in the reform literature, including both of Epps and Sitaraman's. No other proposal ties Court size to an independently derived institutional rationale.
Jurisdiction Stripping¶
Epps and Sitaraman reject jurisdiction stripping as constitutionally uncertain, destabilizing, and subject to partisan retaliation. The Act does not include any jurisdiction-stripping provisions, consistent with its focus on structural process rather than substantive judicial outcomes. There is no disagreement here.
Senate-Based Reform¶
Epps and Sitaraman's critique of Senate reform is their sharpest and most directly relevant to the Act. They argue that restoring the filibuster or changing Senate norms would accomplish nothing because these measures "mistake a symptom for the disease." The deeper structural problems -- polarization, high stakes of individual appointments, incentives for constitutional hardball -- caused the filibuster's demise. Simply restoring it does not address the underlying pathology. They note further that the Garland example proves the insufficiency of Senate reform: Garland was exactly the kind of moderate nominee who should have earned bipartisan support, yet Senate Republicans would not even grant him a hearing.
The Act's response to this critique is its slate-based nomination with Bloc STAR voting -- a structural transformation of the confirmation process that goes far beyond anything Epps and Sitaraman consider. Where they dismiss Senate reform as treating symptoms, the Act identifies the binary single-nominee confirmation model itself as the structural vulnerability and replaces it entirely. The scored multi-nominee selection process transforms Senate incentives: obstruction becomes strategically irrational because participation in Bloc STAR voting allows both majority and minority senators to shape outcomes, while slate rejection triggers presidential resubmission with excluded nominees and gains the Senate nothing. The Senate retains its constitutional authority to reject, but the architecture renders exercise of that authority structurally self-defeating.
Epps and Sitaraman never consider anything resembling this mechanism. Their framework treats the binary confirmation model as a given and looks for workarounds elsewhere in the system -- panel composition, partisan-balance requirements, random selection. The Act's innovation is recognizing that the confirmation process itself can be redesigned through statutory mechanisms that structure the exercise of advice and consent without eliminating Senate authority.
Part III: The Act Against the Two Proposals¶
The Supreme Court Lottery¶
Under the Supreme Court Lottery, every federal appellate judge would also be appointed as a Supreme Court justice -- approximately 180 individuals. The Court would hear cases in randomly selected nine-member panels rotating every two weeks, with a cap of five same-party appointees per panel and a 6-3 supermajority requirement for striking down federal statutes.
The proposal is creative, and several of its instincts align with the Act's goals: reducing the stakes of individual appointments, preventing any single justice from exercising outsized influence, and structurally favoring deference. But the Lottery has structural weaknesses the Act avoids.
Institutional coherence. The Lottery effectively dissolves the Supreme Court as a standing institution. Epps and Sitaraman frame this as expanding the Court to 180 members, but functionally it replaces a permanent body with a rotating cast of appellate judges who carry the title "Associate Justice" while spending the vast majority of their time on circuit courts. The Act preserves the Court as a coherent, identifiable institution -- fifteen justices who know each other, develop working relationships, build institutional memory, and maintain doctrinal continuity through sustained engagement with the Court's docket.
Doctrinal stability. The Lottery creates significant risk of inconsistent jurisprudence across panels. Epps and Sitaraman argue that appellate judges' habits of narrow decision-making, the supermajority requirement, and the partisan-balance cap would mitigate radical swings. These are plausible but speculative claims. The Act's moving-average design achieves ideological moderation through a mathematically demonstrable mechanism -- gradual, predictable turnover that continuously refreshes the Court's composition without abrupt shifts. The moving average is structurally stable in a way that random panel selection cannot guarantee.
Constitutional risk. The Lottery raises constitutional questions the Act avoids entirely. The "one Supreme Court" problem under Article III's Vesting Clause is a genuine concern for a system where the Court's membership changes every two weeks. Whether the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to impose a supermajority requirement for declaring statutes unconstitutional is an open question with thin precedent. And the dual-appointment structure -- where every appellate judge simultaneously holds the office of Supreme Court justice -- pushes the Appointments Clause into novel territory. Epps and Sitaraman offer plausible responses to each objection, but the cumulative constitutional exposure is substantial. The Act's provisions operate closer to established ground: Congress has changed Court size, reorganized circuits, structured Senate procedures, and regulated judicial duties through existing statutory frameworks -- all without the doctrinal novelty the Lottery requires.
Confirmation reform. The Lottery does nothing to reform the confirmation process. It makes individual appointments less consequential by making them more numerous, but the binary nomination-and-confirmation model remains intact for all 180 positions. The Act replaces the binary model with slate-based nomination and Bloc STAR voting, addressing the confirmation pathology that Epps and Sitaraman themselves identify as central to the Court's legitimacy crisis.
The Balanced Bench¶
Under the Balanced Bench, the Court would have fifteen justices: five affiliated with each major party (appointed through normal processes), plus five additional justices chosen unanimously by the ten partisan justices from the circuit courts, serving one-year nonrenewable terms.
The Balanced Bench shares more structural DNA with the Act than the Lottery does -- the fifteen-justice Court size, the incorporation of circuit judges, the ambition to ensure the Court does not vote along strict party lines. But it has serious weaknesses the Act does not share.
Encoded partisan identity. The Balanced Bench requires the government to formally designate justices as "Democratic" or "Republican." This creates exactly the perception of partisan identity that reform is supposed to dissolve. Epps and Sitaraman acknowledge this tension but argue it is necessary to ensure neither side dominates the Court. The Act demonstrates that encoding partisan identity is not necessary. The moving-average effect, the dilution of individual appointments across a fifteen-seat Court, and the Bloc STAR voting dynamic all produce ideological moderation without mentioning parties. This is a fundamental architectural difference: the Balanced Bench manages partisanship by acknowledging and balancing it; the Act manages partisanship by designing structures whose incentive dynamics make partisan capture difficult regardless of which party holds power.
Unanimity veto. The requirement that all ten partisan justices unanimously agree on five additional colleagues creates a powerful obstruction dynamic. A single justice could prevent the Court from achieving a quorum for an entire year. Epps and Sitaraman treat this as a feature -- pressure to compromise. But it is also a vulnerability: a justice who prefers the status quo to any plausible compromise has every incentive to hold out. The Act avoids any mechanism where one actor can unilaterally disable the Court. Vacancy coverage rotation, appointment equalization, and the biennial schedule all ensure the Court continues functioning through predictable, automatic mechanisms that do not depend on any individual's cooperation.
Short terms for visiting justices. The five unanimously selected justices would serve one-year nonrenewable terms. These individuals would likely cast decisive votes on the Court's most important cases, yet they would arrive with no institutional knowledge of the Court's internal dynamics and leave before experiencing the consequences of their decisions. The Act's twelve-year active service terms give justices enough time to develop genuine expertise, invest in the institution's long-term doctrinal coherence, and bear the reputational consequences of their jurisprudence.
Narrow scope. The Balanced Bench addresses one problem -- partisan capture -- through one mechanism. It does nothing about circuit population imbalance, appointment randomness for the partisan seats, ethics enforcement, confirmation dysfunction, Chief Justice power concentration, or actuarial selection bias. The Act is an integrated system addressing six interconnected structural failures through mutually reinforcing mechanisms. The Balanced Bench is a single-mechanism intervention that leaves the rest of the system's pathologies intact.
Part IV: Convergence and Productive Disagreement¶
Where the Frameworks Agree¶
Epps and Sitaraman and the Act share a fundamental diagnosis: the Supreme Court's current design makes partisan capture structurally achievable, and the resulting high-stakes battles over appointments are destroying the Court's institutional legitimacy. Both frameworks reject the view that the current system can be saved through norm restoration or good-faith restraint. Both insist on structural reform implementable by statute. Both prioritize systems that neither party would have reason to repeal under a veil of ignorance.
Their critiques of existing proposals also converge significantly. Both identify the "no stopping principle" as court-packing's fatal weakness. Both dismiss jurisdiction stripping as destabilizing and constitutionally uncertain. Both recognize that Senate reform treats symptoms rather than structural causes. Both see the importance of individual appointments as a primary driver of the Court's politicization. These shared conclusions independently validate the problem analysis underlying the Act.
Where the Frameworks Disagree¶
The principal disagreement concerns whether reform should explicitly encode partisan identity into the Court's structure. Epps and Sitaraman believe it should -- the Balanced Bench's 5-5 parity and the Lottery's same-party cap both treat partisan affiliation as a formal design variable. The Act rejects this approach, achieving ideological moderation through structural consequences rather than partisan labeling. This disagreement is not merely aesthetic; it reflects different theories about how institutional legitimacy is maintained. Epps and Sitaraman believe the public will accept a formally partisan Court if both sides are equally represented. The Act wagers that the public's confidence in the Court depends on the perception that justices are not partisan actors at all -- and that encoding party affiliation into judicial structure undermines this perception regardless of how evenly it is distributed.
A secondary disagreement concerns the supermajority requirement for striking down statutes. The Act's omission of such a requirement reflects its narrower scope: structural reform of how justices are selected, organized, and held accountable, without prescribing how the resulting Court exercises its constitutional authority. This is a defensible scope limitation, but it means the Act does not address one of Epps and Sitaraman's three substantive goals. A future legislature could add a supermajority requirement independently of the Act's other provisions; nothing in the Act's architecture precludes it.
The Commission Report as Contextual Validation¶
The 2021 Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States -- established by Executive Order and comprising thirty-four of the nation's leading constitutional scholars -- surveyed the same problem space that both Epps and Sitaraman and the Act address. The Commission documented appointment randomness, tenure creep, confirmation dysfunction, ethics gaps, and declining public confidence in the Court's legitimacy. It evaluated term limits, court expansion, rotation schemes, panel systems, the Balanced Bench, jurisdiction stripping, supermajority requirements, and ethics reform. It concluded that the Commission's members were "profoundly" divided on solutions and took no position on any proposal.
The Commission's report is useful here not as a source of recommendations -- it made none -- but as authoritative validation that the problems the Act targets are real, widely recognized across the ideological spectrum, and understood to require structural rather than norm-based responses. The Commission's inability to recommend solutions, despite the extraordinary expertise assembled, illustrates a limitation of deliberative bodies operating under consensus constraints. Epps and Sitaraman, unconstrained by the need for unanimous agreement, were able to propose specific architectures. The Act goes further still, integrating multiple reform mechanisms into a coherent system that addresses the full range of dysfunctions the Commission identified.
Conclusion¶
The Act satisfies both of Epps and Sitaraman's reform criteria (statutory implementability and stable equilibrium) and addresses the specific weaknesses they identify in every existing proposal category. It provides the principled stopping principle that court-packing lacks, the structural confirmation reform that Senate-based proposals cannot achieve, the post-service career path that term-limits proposals fail to design, and the institutional coherence that rotation and panel proposals sacrifice.
Against Epps and Sitaraman's own proposals, the Act offers an architecture that avoids the Supreme Court Lottery's sacrifice of institutional identity and doctrinal stability, and the Balanced Bench's encoding of partisan identity and unanimity-veto vulnerability. Where the Lottery depoliticizes by randomization and the Balanced Bench depoliticizes by partisan balancing, the Act depoliticizes through principled structural design -- population-based circuits, equalized appointments, scored multi-nominee selection, and a three-phase career structure whose combined effect produces ideological moderation as an emergent consequence rather than an engineered constraint.
The Act does not pursue Epps and Sitaraman's third substantive goal -- nudging the Court toward deference through a supermajority requirement for striking down statutes. This reflects a deliberate scope limitation: the Act reforms the conditions that produce partisan capture without prescribing how the resulting Court should exercise its constitutional authority. Whether this omission represents a weakness or an appropriate boundary is a question of institutional-design philosophy on which reasonable positions differ.
The broader lesson of this evaluation is that single-mechanism reforms -- however creative -- cannot address the interconnected structural failures that characterize the current system. Epps and Sitaraman's proposals each solve one or two problems well while leaving others untouched. The Act's integrated architecture addresses circuit imbalance, Court size, appointment randomness, confirmation dysfunction, Chief Justice power concentration, and ethics accountability through mutually reinforcing mechanisms. The strongest case for the Act is not that any individual component outperforms the alternatives -- though several do -- but that the components work together as a system in ways that isolated reforms cannot replicate.
Works Cited¶
Amar, Akhil Reed. "Term Limits/Time Rules for Future Justices." Cato Supreme Court Review (2023). https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2023-09/cato-supreme-court-review-1.pdf
Chilton, Adam, Daniel Epps, Kyle Rozema, and Maya Sen. "Designing Supreme Court Term Limits." Southern California Law Review 95, no. 1 (2021): 1-69.
Epps, Daniel, and Ganesh Sitaraman. "How to Save the Supreme Court." Yale Law Journal 129, no. 1 (2019): 148-206.
George, Tracey E., and Chris Guthrie. "Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts' of Appeals Image." Duke Law Journal 58 (2009): 1439-1484.
Pozen, David. "Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball." Balkinization (Oct. 11, 2018). https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/10/hardball-andas-anti-hardball.html
Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States. Final Report. December 2021. https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3779
Segall, Eric J. "Eight Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States Supreme Court." Pepperdine Law Review 45 (2018): 547-584.
Revision history available in the raw file.
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Prepared by Albert Ramos for The American Policy Architecture Institute