Federal Judicial Balance and Accountability Act¶
Overview¶
Published February 2026¶
Based on Rev 2.2 of the Federal Judicial Balance and Accountability Act
Problem Statement¶
The federal judiciary operates under a structure designed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that no longer serves constitutional principles of equal representation and balanced power. Seven interconnected dysfunctions undermine public confidence and judicial effectiveness.
Population imbalance across circuits. The current thirteen federal circuits reflect historical state groupings rather than contemporary population distribution. The Ninth Circuit serves over 68 million people across nine states and two territories; the First Circuit serves under 14 million across six states and territories. This nearly five-to-one disparity creates unequal workloads, inconsistent case processing times, and fundamentally unequal access to federal justice depending on where litigants happen to reside. As population continues shifting toward the Sun Belt and away from the Northeast, these disparities will only worsen.
Arbitrary appointment opportunities. Supreme Court vacancies depend entirely on when sitting justices die or choose to retire -- factors bearing no relationship to constitutional design or democratic mandate. President Carter appointed zero justices during his term; President Trump appointed three in four years. This actuarial randomness means that some presidents shape constitutional interpretation for generations while others leave no mark on the Court at all. The resulting incentives encourage strategic retirement timing, discourage justices from stepping down during administrations of the opposing party, and concentrate enormous power based on luck rather than legitimate democratic processes.
National anxiety over justice health and longevity. The current system creates a perverse dynamic where the nation holds its breath every time an aging justice shows signs of decline. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's final years illustrated this vividly -- her health became a matter of intense national anxiety, her every hospital visit triggered speculation about the Court's future, and her death precipitated a constitutional crisis. This is not a dignified way to treat distinguished jurists who have devoted their careers to public service, and it is not a healthy dynamic for the republic. The current system forces impossible choices on aging justices: retire strategically to benefit their preferred party, or cling to office hoping to outlast an unfavorable administration.
Concentration of power in the Chief Justice. The current system allows a single individual to serve as Chief Justice for decades, accumulating enormous administrative and symbolic authority. The Chief Justice chairs the Judicial Conference, appoints judges to specialized tribunals, assigns opinions when in the majority, and presides over impeachment trials. These powers -- accumulated through statutory accretion rather than constitutional design -- concentrate in one person based on actuarial chance and presidential preference rather than any democratic principle.
Erosion of confirmation norms and Senate obstruction. The judicial appointment process has devolved from professional evaluation to partisan warfare. The Senate blocked consideration of the Garland nomination for nearly a year in 2016, then confirmed the Barrett nomination in weeks during 2020. The binary single-nominee confirmation model concentrates maximum leverage in the Senate's ability to reject, creating powerful obstruction incentives that require no affirmative action -- the Senate need only refuse to act. Empirical research demonstrates that 62-75% of vacancies under proposed term limit systems would arise during periods of divided government, making Senate obstruction not an aberration but a predictable structural vulnerability inherent in the binary confirmation model.
Opacity in nominee evaluation. The confirmation process has become theatrical -- senators ask hypothetical questions designed to score political points; nominees provide carefully rehearsed non-answers. The process provides no structural guarantee that the Senate will act on nominations, that nominees will have evaluable records of legal reasoning, or that the public will receive meaningful information about judicial philosophy before lifetime appointments are made.
Absence of enforceable ethical standards. The Supreme Court is the only court in the federal system that operates without binding ethical rules and without any mechanism for investigating or sanctioning ethical violations. Lower federal judges are bound by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and subject to discipline under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act. Supreme Court justices are bound by neither. The Court's November 2023 adoption of a voluntary ethics code was a response to public pressure but lacks any enforcement mechanism -- justices decide for themselves whether they have violated the code and what, if anything, to do about it. Ongoing controversies over undisclosed gifts, travel, real estate transactions, and relationships with parties who have business before the Court demonstrate that this self-policing model has failed to maintain public confidence.
These are not partisan complaints about specific outcomes. They are structural failures that would concern any observer regardless of which party benefits at any given moment. The current system depends on norms of restraint and good faith that have collapsed under partisan pressure. Structural reform is necessary because informal constraints have proven inadequate.
Solution Architecture¶
The Federal Judicial Balance and Accountability Act (FJBAA), hereafter "the Act," addresses these dysfunctions through seven integrated structural mechanisms rather than relying on norms, restraint, or good intentions.
Population-based circuit organization replaces historical boundaries with mathematical formula. Fifteen regional circuits serve approximately equal populations, with boundaries drawn using federal judicial districts as building blocks and maintained through a structured five-year compliance assessment cycle. Population assessments occur at two intervals -- an authoritative assessment within one year of each decennial census and an interim assessment at the midpoint using American Community Survey data -- with a tiered response framework that tolerates minor imperfections while triggering mandatory rebalancing when three or more circuits fall outside the tolerance band. This ensures equal representation and balanced workloads regardless of where populations migrate over time. The structure eliminates the current disparities through principled, data-driven mechanisms rather than requiring future legislation as demographics shift. If population growth eventually renders boundary adjustment insufficient, the Act provides a circuit count adjustment mechanism that maintains the same principled derivation underlying the initial fifteen.
Circuit-aligned Court composition ties Supreme Court size to administrative structure rather than political convenience. Fifteen Associate Justices correspond to fifteen regional circuits, restoring the historical relationship between circuit organization and Court membership that existed when six justices served six circuits and nine justices served nine circuits. This provides a principled basis for Court size that transcends immediate partisan calculations and forecloses endless expansion.
Three-phase career structure removes the nation's constitutional future from dependence on individual justices' health and longevity. Each justice progresses through three distinct phases: Associate Justice for years one through ten, Co-Chief Justice for years eleven and twelve, and Senior Justice thereafter. This structure provides clarity and predictability -- every justice knows exactly what their career arc will look like, eliminating strategic retirement calculations and the morbid national anxiety that accompanies aging justices under the current system. Senior Justices retain full Article III protections, life tenure, and full compensation while serving in a reduced-duty capacity.
Shared Co-Chief Justice leadership diffuses the concentration of power that currently resides in the Chief Justice position. Rather than a single individual serving as Chief Justice for decades based on presidential selection and actuarial chance, multiple justices serve simultaneously as Co-Chief Justices during their capstone years, sharing administrative responsibilities pursuant to rules established by the Judicial Conference. The President designates one Co-Chief Justice as Ceremonial Chief Justice to exercise constitutionally specified functions such as presiding over presidential impeachment trials. Every justice who completes a full term serves as Co-Chief Justice -- democratizing an honor and responsibility that the current system distributes arbitrarily.
Vacancy coverage and appointment equalization protect the balanced appointment schedule from disruption. When unexpected vacancies occur during a justice's active service, Senior Justices fill the vacant seat through a random lottery rotation system until the seat is filled at its next regularly scheduled biennial appointment -- vacancies do not create additional presidential appointment opportunities. An equalization mechanism ensures that each presidential term includes exactly five appointment opportunities once the schedule reaches steady state, preventing the mathematical asymmetries inherent in the fifteen-seat, twelve-year structure from producing windfalls for any particular president.
Slate-based nomination with scored voting replaces the binary single-nominee confirmation model that has become the focal point for partisan obstruction. Rather than submitting one nominee for an up-or-down vote, the President submits a slate of multiple qualified candidates, and the Senate selects from among them using Bloc STAR voting -- a scored procedure in which each senator scores each nominee from 0 to 5, with the highest aggregate scores determining selection. This transforms the Senate's role from adversarial gatekeeping into collaborative selection. The Senate retains authority to reject an entire slate, but the architecture makes obstruction strategically irrational: participation in scored voting allows both majority and minority senators to shape outcomes, while rejection triggers resubmission with excluded nominees and gains the Senate nothing. Evidence-based transparency requirements ensure that nominees have evaluable records of legal reasoning while preserving presidential nomination discretion.
Binding ethics enforcement replaces self-policing with structural accountability. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges becomes mandatory for Supreme Court justices. An Ethics Review Panel composed of Senior Justices adjudicates complaints, with an independent Judicial Inspector General conducting investigations. A graduated menu of sanctions -- from private admonition to mandatory early transition to Senior Justice status -- provides proportionate responses to ethical violations. Due process protections and supermajority requirements for serious sanctions prevent weaponization while ensuring meaningful accountability.
These mechanisms work together as a coherent system. Circuit reorganization provides the principled basis for Court expansion. Court expansion enables the predictable appointment schedule. The appointment schedule creates the framework for the three-phase career structure. Shared Co-Chief Justice leadership ensures every justice participates in leading the Court. Vacancy coverage and appointment equalization protect the balanced schedule from disruption. Slate-based nomination with Bloc STAR voting structurally disincentivizes Senate obstruction while preserving both presidential nomination authority and Senate advice and consent. Transparency requirements ensure the appointment process produces evaluable nominees. Ethics enforcement ensures that justices who violate binding standards face meaningful consequences. Each component reinforces the others.
Title-by-Title Summary¶
Title I: Federal Circuit Reorganization establishes fifteen population-based regional circuits replacing the current geographic arrangement. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts draws boundaries within 180 days of enactment using federal judicial districts as building blocks, ensuring no circuit serves more than 110% or less than 90% of the average circuit population. The Act prioritizes keeping all districts within a state assigned to the same circuit but permits division along existing federal judicial district boundaries where population equity within the tolerance band cannot otherwise be achieved -- no subdivision of a federal judicial district is authorized. Population compliance is maintained through a structured five-year assessment cycle: an authoritative assessment within one year of each decennial census using census data, and an interim assessment at the approximate midpoint using American Community Survey five-year estimates. A tiered response framework governs action: zero to one circuits outside the tolerance band requires no action; two circuits triggers contingency planning; three or more triggers mandatory rebalancing. When the Administrative Office determines that boundary adjustments alone cannot restore compliance, it reports to Congress with an analysis of the minimum additional circuits required, and the creation of new circuits -- with corresponding Supreme Court composition adjustments -- requires an act of Congress. Existing circuit judges are reassigned based on primary residence. The District of Columbia Circuit and Federal Circuit retain their specialized jurisdictions unchanged, preserving established expertise in administrative law and patent matters. Each regional circuit maintains at least six active judges.
Title II: Supreme Court Composition and Appointments aligns the Court with circuit organization through fifteen justice positions progressing through a three-phase career structure. Expansion proceeds gradually -- one additional justice appointed each odd-numbered year during the transition period. The Act establishes three career phases: Associate Justice for years one through ten (hearing and deciding cases), Co-Chief Justice for years eleven and twelve (sharing administrative leadership of the Court and federal judiciary), and Senior Justice thereafter (reduced-duty status with full Article III protections). Multiple justices serve simultaneously as Co-Chief Justices, with the Judicial Conference establishing rules for dividing administrative responsibilities. The President designates one Co-Chief Justice as Ceremonial Chief Justice -- exercising constitutionally specified functions such as presiding over presidential impeachment trials and administering the presidential oath of office. Senior Justices retain full constitutional protections, salary, benefits, and life tenure. They may continue hearing cases, sit on circuit courts by designation, serve on the Ethics Review Panel, or decline discretionary assignments without penalty. They are also eligible for vacancy coverage rotation assignments.
For each biennial appointment cycle, the President submits a nomination slate containing multiple nominees -- at least two per available position and no more than 2.5 per position rounded up. The Senate selects from the slate using Bloc STAR voting: each senator scores each nominee from 0 to 5, scores are aggregated across all senators, and the nominees with the highest aggregate scores fill available positions. Automatic runoff procedures resolve near-ties. The Senate may reject an entire slate, triggering presidential resubmission within thirty days; nominees from a rejected slate are excluded from the immediately subsequent slate. Carryover nominees from prior slates may be included on subsequent slates at the President's discretion for up to five years from original documentation submission, with abbreviated hearings focused on developments since prior appearance.
When an unexpected vacancy occurs during a justice's active service -- from death, incapacity, removal, or voluntary early transition -- the Administrative Office conducts a random lottery from the pool of available Senior Justices to assign one to fill the vacant seat for each October Term until the seat's next regularly scheduled biennial appointment. Vacancies do not create additional presidential appointment opportunities. An appointment equalization mechanism addresses the mathematical asymmetry inherent in the fifteen-seat, twelve-year structure by redistributing appointment opportunities so that each presidential term includes exactly five appointments once the schedule reaches steady state.
All justices confirmed to commence service in the same year must be sworn in together during the same ceremony, reinforcing that justices enter service as institutional cohorts rather than individual presidential appointees and preventing strategic timing of oath ceremonies.
Title III: Transparency and Evaluative Standards for Nominations establishes evidence-based requirements ensuring nominees have evaluable records of legal reasoning, calibrated for multi-nominee evaluation under the slate-based process. The President must submit, concurrently with any nomination slate, at least ten self-selected works of substantial legal analysis authored by each nominee, representing the nominee's best and most characteristic legal reasoning. These works may include judicial opinions, legal scholarship, appellate briefs, legislative analysis, executive branch legal memoranda, or formal legal opinions from professional practice -- six distinct pathways enabling diverse career backgrounds. Submitted works must address at least three of six specified subject areas spanning the Court's jurisdiction: constitutional structure, individual rights, federal jurisdiction, statutory interpretation, administrative law, and criminal law.
Nominees must provide a professional biography and a judicial philosophy statement of at least 2,000 words addressing their approach to constitutional interpretation, the role of precedent, and the judicial function -- with specific reference to examples from their submitted documentation. All materials for every nominee on a slate must be made publicly available within seventy-two hours of submission. No hearings may commence sooner than twenty-one days after the Senate Judiciary Committee certifies all nomination records as complete. The Committee determines within fourteen days whether submitted documentation is complete; the Senate must act on the slate -- either by conducting Bloc STAR voting or rejecting the slate -- within 120 days. Each nominee receives one full day of hearings, with carryover nominees receiving abbreviated half-day hearings focused on developments since their prior appearance. Congressional findings affirm that epistemic diversity strengthens the Court and explicitly preserve the President's constitutional authority to nominate any person.
Title IV: Implementation and Fairness Provisions phases the reforms across multiple years. Circuit reorganization takes effect two years after enactment, allowing adequate preparation time. Court expansion begins in the first odd-numbered year of the Appointment Schedule. Transparency requirements and the slate-based nomination process apply immediately to all nominations after the effective date, including expansion appointments. For expansion appointments filling a single position, the nomination slate contains two to three nominees. Co-Chief Justice service begins when justices appointed under the expansion schedule reach their eleventh year of active service. The regular replacement schedule begins twelve years after the first expansion appointment, when the first justice appointed under the Act transitions from Co-Chief Justice to Senior Justice. Constitutional protections are explicitly preserved: no sitting justice is removed from office, no judicial salary is reduced, and "good behavior" tenure remains fully intact.
The Chief Justice serving on the effective date (the "Legacy Chief Justice") continues in that capacity -- retaining all ceremonial functions and administrative authority -- while Co-Chief Justices appointed under the Act gradually share administrative responsibilities. Legacy Associate Justices may continue in active service indefinitely, voluntarily elect Senior Justice status, or elect to enter the Act's career structure through a voluntary opt-in mechanism. Electing justices claim available Co-Chief Justice slots, serve a two-year capstone, and transition to Senior Justice status. The opt-in is purely voluntary -- declining carries no consequence. Vacated seats are handled through the vacancy coverage rotation system rather than creating additional presidential appointments. Severability provisions ensure partial implementation if any provision faces successful legal challenge.
Title V: Judicial Ethics and Accountability establishes binding ethical standards and enforcement for the Supreme Court. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges applies in its entirety to all justices, with compliance mandatory rather than advisory. Justices must provide written explanations for recusal decisions, published on the Court's website and compiled in annual reports to Congress.
An Ethics Review Panel of five Senior Justices adjudicates ethics complaints. During the transition period before sufficient Senior Justices are available, retired circuit chief judges selected by lottery serve on a Bridge Panel to ensure immediate capacity. The Panel may impose sanctions ranging from private admonition to public censure, mandatory recusal, administrative reassignment, mandatory early transition to Senior Justice status, and referral to the House for impeachment consideration. Serious sanctions require a four-of-five supermajority vote, preventing partisan weaponization.
A Judicial Inspector General -- selected by the Ethics Review Panel from candidates nominated by a committee including the Comptroller General, retired circuit judges, and the ABA president -- serves a ten-year non-renewable term and may be removed only for cause by unanimous Panel vote. The Inspector General receives complaints, conducts preliminary review and investigation, and reports findings to the Panel.
Comprehensive due process protections ensure fairness: written notice of allegations, access to evidence, right to counsel, opportunity to respond, hearing before the Panel, and written decisions with reasons. Complaints and investigations remain confidential until final determination. A justice subject to serious sanctions may appeal to the full body of Senior Justices (En Banc Senior Body), with automatic stay pending review.
Mandatory Early Transition -- the most serious sanction short of impeachment referral -- may be imposed only for enumerated objective violations: undisclosed financial interests above specified thresholds, participation in matters despite conflicts, ex parte contacts, intentional misrepresentation on disclosure forms, acceptance of substantial undisclosed benefits from parties likely to appear before the Court, and willful persistent violation after prior sanction. This enumeration prevents the sanction from being used to punish disfavored judicial philosophies.
Title V explicitly preserves congressional impeachment authority and Department of Justice criminal jurisdiction. The ethics framework supplements rather than supplants these constitutional mechanisms.
Implementation Overview¶
The Act unfolds across three phases spanning approximately fifteen years from enactment to steady-state operation, with transparency requirements, the slate-based nomination process, and ethics infrastructure operational from Year One.
Phase One (Years 1-2): Circuit Reorganization, Transparency Requirements, Slate Process, Ethics Infrastructure, and Legacy Opt-In. The Administrative Office develops population-based circuit boundaries using federal judicial districts as building blocks. States and courts prepare for transition. New circuit structure takes effect approximately two years after enactment. Existing judges are reassigned; additional circuit judges are appointed as needed. Transparency requirements and the slate-based nomination process apply immediately to any nomination submitted after the effective date, including the first expansion appointment. Simultaneously, the first Judicial Inspector General is appointed within one year. The Ethics Review Panel (supplemented by Bridge Panel as needed) adopts rules of procedure. The Code of Conduct becomes binding immediately, and complaint intake begins. The Administrative Office publishes the Appointment Schedule and the schedule of available Co-Chief Justice slots for legacy opt-in elections. The first population compliance assessment occurs within one year of the first decennial census following enactment.
Phase Two (Years 2-12): Court Expansion and Vacancy Coverage. Beginning in the first odd-numbered year of the Appointment Schedule, the President submits a nomination slate and the Senate selects additional Associate Justices via Bloc STAR voting. This continues each odd-numbered year until the Court reaches fifteen Associate Justices -- approximately six expansion appointments total. During this transition, multiple administrations participate in shaping the expanded Court. All nominees must satisfy Title III documentation requirements, ensuring evaluable records regardless of career background. For expansion appointments filling a single position, the President submits two to three nominees; during later steady-state cycles with multiple positions available, slates expand proportionally. Ethics enforcement operates throughout, with the Inspector General investigating complaints and the Ethics Review Panel adjudicating findings. If any unexpected vacancy occurs during this phase, the vacancy coverage rotation system deploys Senior Justices to fill the seat temporarily without creating additional presidential appointment opportunities. Legacy Associate Justices who have elected opt-in begin transitioning according to their assigned Co-Chief Justice slots.
Phase Three (Year 11+): Three-Phase Career Structure, Regular Replacement, and Steady State. Eleven years after the first expansion appointment, the Co-Chief Justice phase begins when the first justices appointed under the expansion schedule reach their eleventh year of active service. Twelve years after the first expansion appointment, the regular replacement cycle begins: those justices complete their two-year terms as Co-Chief Justices and transition to Senior Justice status, creating vacancies. From that point forward, each odd-numbered year brings predictable transitions -- justices move from Associate Justice to Co-Chief Justice, and outgoing Co-Chief Justices transition to Senior Justice. The appointment equalization mechanism ensures that each presidential term receives exactly five appointment opportunities once the schedule reaches steady state. The President submits nomination slates with the appropriate number of nominees, and the Senate selects via Bloc STAR voting. Carryover nominees from prior slates may appear on subsequent slates for up to five years, receiving abbreviated hearings. As expansion-appointed justices accumulate in Senior Justice status, the Ethics Review Panel transitions from Bridge Panel supplementation to full Senior Justice composition (approximately Year 21, when five expansion-appointed Senior Justices are available). The vacancy coverage roster grows as more Senior Justices become available, strengthening the system's capacity to handle unexpected departures. The structured compliance assessment cycle ensures circuit boundaries remain population-balanced as demographics shift over time, with the tiered response framework triggering corrective action when degradation reaches a level that undermines the Act's equity principles. The system reaches equilibrium: five appointments per presidential term, slate-based selection with Bloc STAR voting, every justice serving as Co-Chief Justice, constitutional outcomes no longer dependent on individual health and longevity, and robust ethics enforcement by peers of equal constitutional stature.
This phased approach serves multiple purposes. It spreads expansion appointments across multiple administrations, preventing any single president from dominating the transition. It allows the judicial system time to absorb changes incrementally. It demonstrates the reform's operation before reaching full implementation, building legitimacy through successful execution. And it ensures transparency requirements, the slate-based nomination process, and ethics enforcement capacity from Day One while allowing the enforcement structure to mature as Senior Justices become available.
Conclusion¶
The Act represents structural judicial reform addressing both balance and accountability. The distinction from ideological court-packing matters. Court-packing -- adding seats to change immediate outcomes -- triggers an arms race with no stopping principle and destroys institutional legitimacy. The Act ties Court size to circuit organization, phases expansion across multiple administrations, creates a regular replacement schedule that treats all future presidents equally regardless of party, diffuses the power of the Chief Justice position through shared Co-Chief Justice leadership, protects the balanced schedule through vacancy coverage and appointment equalization, replaces the obstruction-prone binary confirmation model with slate-based selection and Bloc STAR voting, and establishes binding ethics enforcement with structural safeguards against weaponization.
The reform addresses genuine structural problems: population imbalance across circuits, arbitrary appointment opportunities based on actuarial chance, national anxiety over justice health and longevity, concentration of power in a single Chief Justice for decades, Senate obstruction as a structural vulnerability of the binary confirmation model, opacity in nominee evaluation, and the absence of enforceable ethical standards. It does so through mechanisms that work regardless of which party holds power at any given moment.
The Act does not predetermine judicial outcomes, mandate particular judicial philosophies, or remove any sitting justice. It does not constrain presidential nomination discretion -- any person may be included on a nomination slate, subject to documentation requirements enabling Senate evaluation. It does not allow punishment of justices for their judicial opinions, votes, or legal interpretations. It does not compel any existing justice to enter the Act's career structure -- the opt-in mechanism is voluntary and carries no consequence for declining. It creates conditions for a well-functioning judiciary -- equal representation, predictable appointments, a dignified career structure, shared leadership, evaluable nominees, collaborative confirmation, transparent processes, and meaningful accountability -- without dictating what that judiciary should decide.
The full legislative text provides complete statutory language. The Policy Rationale explains the design choices underlying this architecture.
Revision History¶
Revision 2.2 (Current) - Updated reference line to reflect FJBAA Rev 2.2 - Updated Solution Architecture "Population-based circuit organization" paragraph: replaced "rebalanced following each decennial census" with five-year compliance assessment cycle, tiered response framework, district-level building blocks, and circuit count adjustment mechanism - Rewrote Title I summary: replaced whole-state constraint with district-level building block approach using federal judicial districts; replaced single-sentence decennial rebalancing with structured five-year compliance assessment cycle (authoritative and interim assessments), tiered response framework (compliant, advisory, mandatory rebalancing), and circuit count adjustment mechanism requiring congressional action; added population data standards - Updated Title IV summary: replaced hard-coded date references with enactment-relative language consistent with Rev 2.2 dating conventions - Updated Phase One: added reference to federal judicial districts as building blocks and first population compliance assessment - Updated Phase Two: replaced hard-coded date anchoring with Appointment Schedule references - Updated Phase Three: added compliance assessment cycle to steady-state description - No substantive changes to Problem Statement, Titles II, III, or V summaries, or Conclusion
Revision 2.1 - Updated reference line to reflect FJBAA Rev 2.1 - Added "Senate obstruction" as structural vulnerability in Problem Statement, incorporating empirical findings on divided government exposure (62-75% of vacancies) - Split former "Erosion of confirmation norms" into two dysfunctions: "Erosion of confirmation norms and Senate obstruction" and "Opacity in nominee evaluation" (seven dysfunctions total) - Added "Slate-based nomination with scored voting" as seventh structural mechanism in Solution Architecture, explaining Bloc STAR voting, strategic incentive transformation, and slate rejection dynamics - Rewrote Title II summary: added slate-based nomination process (minimum/maximum slate sizing, Bloc STAR voting procedure, slate rejection and resubmission, carryover nominees with 5-year eligibility and abbreviated hearings) - Rewrote Title III summary: updated documentation from 50 works to 10 self-selected works, judicial philosophy statement from 5,000 to 2,000 words; added calibration for multi-nominee evaluation; updated Senate procedures for slate consideration (72-hour disclosure, 21-day review period, one-day hearings per nominee, carryover abbreviated hearings) - Updated Title IV summary: added slate-based nomination and Bloc STAR voting as immediately effective; noted expansion appointment slate sizing (2-3 nominees for single positions) - Updated Phase One to include slate process as immediately effective - Updated Phase Two to describe slate-based expansion process with proportional slate sizing - Rewrote Phase Three steady-state description to include Bloc STAR voting, carryover nominees, and slate-based selection - Updated integration paragraph for slate-based nomination mechanism - Updated Conclusion for slate-based confirmation, Senate obstruction as structural problem addressed - Changed Problem Statement from six to seven dysfunctions - Changed Solution Architecture from six to seven mechanisms - Updated publication date to February 2026
Revision 2.0 - Updated reference line to reflect FJBAA Rev 2.0 - Added "Concentration of power in the Chief Justice" as sixth dysfunction in Problem Statement - Replaced "Automatic Chief Justice rotation" with "Shared Co-Chief Justice leadership" in Solution Architecture, explaining simultaneous Co-Chief Justice service, Ceremonial Chief Justice designation, and Judicial Conference rulemaking - Added "Vacancy coverage and appointment equalization" as new structural mechanism in Solution Architecture - Rewrote Title II summary: Co-Chief Justice model with shared administrative duties, Ceremonial Chief Justice designation, vacancy coverage rotation system, appointment equalization (five appointments per term at steady state), and mutual oath requirement - Rewrote Title IV summary: Legacy Chief Justice transition, Legacy Associate Justice voluntary opt-in mechanism (Section 403(d)), vacancy handling through Section 205 - Updated Phase One to include legacy opt-in slot publication - Updated Phase Two to include vacancy coverage and legacy opt-in transitions - Rewrote Phase Three for Co-Chief Justice model, appointment equalization (five per term), vacancy coverage roster growth, and steady-state description - Updated Conclusion for Co-Chief model, vacancy coverage, appointment equalization, and voluntary legacy opt-in - Updated integration paragraph for new mechanisms - Updated Co-Chief Justice terminology throughout - Updated publication date to February 2026
Revision 1.7 - Updated reference line to reflect FJBAA Rev 1.7 - No substantive content changes (Rev 1.7 legislative text changes were clarifying, not substantive)
Revision 1.6 - Updated to reflect FJBAA Rev 1.6 - Revised Problem Statement "Erosion of confirmation norms" to emphasize evaluability rather than qualifications - Changed fifth structural mechanism from "Structural qualification and transparency requirements" to "Evidence-based transparency requirements" - Completely rewrote Title III summary - Updated Title IV summary to note transparency requirements apply immediately - Updated Phase One to include transparency requirements - Updated Phase Two to note all nominees must satisfy documentation requirements - Updated Conclusion to note Act does not constrain presidential nomination discretion - Added "opacity in nominee evaluation" to list of structural problems addressed
Revision 1.5 - Updated to reflect FJBAA Rev 1.5 - Added "Absence of enforceable ethical standards" to Problem Statement - Added "Binding ethics enforcement" as sixth structural mechanism in Solution Architecture - Added comprehensive Title V summary to Title-by-Title Summary section - Updated Phase One description to include ethics infrastructure establishment - Updated Phase Two description to note ethics enforcement operates throughout - Updated Phase Three description to include ethics maturation timeline - Revised Conclusion to address both "balance" and "accountability" components - Added ethics enforcement to list of structural problems addressed - Added note that Act does not allow punishment for judicial opinions
Revision 1.4 - No substantive changes to overview (Rev 1.4 changes were clarifying, not substantive)
Revision 1.3 - Added national anxiety over justice health and longevity to Problem Statement - Revised Solution Architecture to feature three-phase career structure as distinct mechanism - Updated Title II summary with three-phase terminology (Associate Justice, Chief Justice, Senior Justice) - Revised Phase Three to explain career progression and Chief Justice rotation timing - Updated Conclusion to include national anxiety and dignified career structure among problems addressed - Applied self-reference convention per APAI Document Production Standards Section 1.7
Revision 1.2 - Added automatic Chief Justice rotation as fifth structural mechanism in Solution Architecture - Revised Title II summary to explain seniority-based CJ selection and two-year term - Added CJ rotation timing to Title IV summary - Updated Phase Three to include Chief Justice rotation - Revised Conclusion to include CJ rotation among structural reforms
Revision 1.1 - Initial publication based on FJBAA Rev 1.1
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Prepared by Albert Ramos for The American Policy Architecture Institute