Civil Service Accountability Act¶
Laying the Groundwork for a Renewed Civil Service¶
Published February 2026¶
Based on Rev 1.3 of the Civil Service Accountability Act
Overview¶
The Civil Service Accountability Act is designed to function under current institutional conditions. It can be enacted, implemented, and operated within the existing two-party system and constitutional framework. Nothing in the CSAA requires the Congressional Modernization Framework as a legal prerequisite.
That said, the CMF transforms the political environment in which the CSAA operates -- and that transformation strengthens not merely the probability of passage but the functional effectiveness of every major provision within the Act. This document analyzes those interactions systematically, examining how the multi-party, coalition-based Congress that the CMF produces creates institutional conditions under which the CSAA performs closer to its design potential.
The relationship is not one of dependency but of reinforcement. The CSAA solves a real problem -- the over-politicization of the federal executive -- under any congressional configuration. The CMF solves a different problem -- the procedural dysfunction of a winner-take-all legislature. Together, they professionalize both how laws are made and how laws are executed, creating a coherent governance modernization architecture.
The Core Interaction: Why Congressional Structure Matters for Civil Service Reform¶
The CSAA's central challenge is not technical but political. The Act asks Congress to voluntarily surrender thousands of patronage appointments, confirm career professionals to positions previously reserved for political loyalists, and sustain oversight mechanisms that hold those professionals accountable. Every one of those actions depends on congressional behavior, and congressional behavior is shaped by the incentive structures that the CMF directly modifies.
Under the current two-party system, civil service reform faces a specific structural obstacle: both parties treat political appointments as spoils to be captured and defended. When one party holds the presidency, it views the patronage system as essential to implementing its agenda. When the other party controls the Senate, it views confirmation as a weapon to obstruct. The result is that neither party has a sustained institutional interest in professionalizing the executive branch -- both prefer the option of staffing agencies with loyalists when they next win power.
The CMF disrupts this calculus by changing the fundamental incentive structure of Congress. In a multi-party coalition environment, no single party expects to capture all of the spoils from any given election. Coalition governance distributes power and dilutes the winner-take-all reward that makes patronage valuable. The question shifts from "how many loyalists can we install?" to "how do we ensure competent implementation of negotiated policy?"
That shift in incentive is the foundation upon which every provision-level interaction rests.
Provision-by-Provision Analysis¶
The Political Appointee Cap (Title IV, Section 602)¶
The CSAA right-sizes political appointments from approximately 4,000 authorized positions to approximately 1,000 through a formula capping appointments at 1.25% of the senior policy and management workforce (~80,000 people), with a floor of 1.0% (~800) and ceiling of 1.5% (~1,200).
The empirical grounding of the Rev 1.3 formula -- anchored to what administrations actually staff rather than aspirational targets -- changes the political dynamics of the cap in important ways. No modern administration has functionally staffed more than approximately 2,000-2,100 positions. The CSAA is not asking presidents to accept a 75% reduction from what they currently use; it is asking them to formalize the approximately 1,000 positions that demonstrably earn their keep while eliminating the approximately 2,000-3,000 positions that exist as patronage rather than governance.
Under current conditions, even this reframed reduction provokes resistance because each party views any patronage reduction as disadvantageous when they next hold the presidency. Under CMF conditions, the calculus changes in three ways. First, presidents in a multi-party environment govern through coalition, not unilateral command. The executive agenda is itself negotiated, reducing the need for partisan enforcers embedded in agencies. When policy direction emerges from coalition compromise rather than single-party dominance, the president needs competent implementers more than loyal foot soldiers. Second, the patronage appointments themselves lose value in a coalition Congress. When the president's party holds perhaps 30-40% of seats rather than a narrow majority, the spoils system produces proportionally fewer rewards. Third, coalition partners actively prefer professional administration because it protects their negotiated policy priorities from being undermined by the dominant coalition partner's appointees. A professional civil service becomes insurance for junior coalition members -- their policy wins get implemented faithfully regardless of which party holds the presidency.
The three-tranche conversion approach further reduces resistance. Tranche 1 eliminates approximately 2,000 chronically vacant positions that no administration actually uses -- a reform that costs no president anything in practice. Tranche 2 converts operational positions through attrition, avoiding forced removals. Tranche 3 addresses genuine boundary cases through individual evaluation. Under CMF conditions, this phased approach aligns with coalition governance norms where incremental institutional reform builds trust across party groups.
Tiered Confirmation of SPS Officers (Title III, Section 502)¶
The CSAA implements tiered confirmation for Senior Professional Service officers: full Senate confirmation for CS-1 (Deputy Secretary equivalent) with 6-year terms, committee confirmation with 60-day default approval for CS-2 (Undersecretary equivalent) with 5-year terms, and professional merit panel selection for CS-3 (Assistant Secretary equivalent) with career appointments.
This tiered structure directly addresses the primary objection to SPS confirmation under current conditions -- that confirmation would become a partisan battlefield. By limiting full Senate confirmation to CS-1 positions only, the CSAA reduces the number of career officials subjected to floor-level partisan dynamics. The committee confirmation mechanism for CS-2 with default approval creates oversight without creating confirmation warfare for every Undersecretary across the executive branch. CS-3 positions avoid politicization entirely through merit panel selection.
Under CMF conditions, even CS-1 confirmations improve dramatically. The OCP's proportional procedural allocation distributes committee leadership across multiple party groups rather than concentrating it in a single majority. Confirmation hearings would be conducted by committees where no single party controls the agenda. The incentive to weaponize confirmation diminishes because obstruction loses strategic value in a coalition environment -- blocking a nominee gains nothing when your party needs coalition partners to accomplish anything.
The CMF Integration Analysis identifies this dynamic directly: "When no faction can govern alone, obstruction only ensures nothing happens -- including the obstructing faction's priorities." Applied to SPS confirmations, this means that blocking a qualified career nominee produces no partisan advantage. The nominee is not a political opponent -- they are a professional whose competence serves whoever holds power. Coalition partners have a shared interest in filling SPS positions efficiently because vacant positions create implementation gaps that harm all parties' policy priorities.
Furthermore, the OCP's anti-bottleneck provisions create procedural pathways that prevent indefinite holds. Bills and nominations meeting bipartisan co-sponsorship thresholds or committee passage earn calendar placement within 30 legislative days. Applied to CS-1 confirmations, these mechanisms ensure that qualified nominees cannot be buried through silent inaction. For CS-2 positions, the 60-day default approval mechanism functions independently of congressional structure -- but the CMF environment makes committee rejection votes less likely because the political incentive to block professional nominees diminishes.
The result is confirmation that functions more like European civil service appointment processes or current U.S. military flag officer confirmations -- substantive but not adversarial, producing professional scrutiny rather than partisan theater.
Deputy Secretaries as Career Officials (Title III, Section 501)¶
Converting Deputy Secretaries from political appointees to CS-1 career professionals with 6-year terms is the CSAA's most structurally ambitious provision. Under current conditions, this provision generates the strongest resistance because it means a new president inherits Deputy Secretaries nominated by a predecessor -- potentially one from the opposing party.
The shortened term length in Rev 1.3 (6 years rather than 10) mitigates this concern significantly under any congressional configuration. Every president nominates roughly half the CS-1 corps within their first term, ensuring democratic renewal while preserving institutional continuity. No president serves a full term without meaningful input into departmental leadership. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs serves a 4-year term (renewable once), not 10 years -- the revised CS-1 term aligns more closely with this proven precedent.
Under CMF conditions, the remaining concern diminishes further for three interconnected reasons.
First, presidential transitions in a multi-party environment are less ideologically disruptive. When governance operates through coalition, the policy distance between successive administrations narrows. A Deputy Secretary who served under a center-right coalition is not an ideological alien to a center-left coalition -- they are a professional administrator whose institutional knowledge is valuable to both.
Second, Cabinet Secretaries themselves may be coalition figures. In parliamentary democracies with professional civil services, it is routine for ministers from one coalition party to work effectively with permanent secretaries who previously served under different governments. The CMF creates conditions where this norm can develop in the American context. When the Secretary of Energy is a coalition appointment rather than a pure partisan loyalist, the expectation of working with professional deputies becomes natural rather than adversarial.
Third, the staggered term structure means Deputy Secretaries do not all turn over simultaneously. Presidents inherit a functioning institutional leadership corps and gradually shape it through nominations as terms expire -- precisely as they do with the Federal Reserve Board, military flag officers, and independent regulatory commissions. The CMF normalizes this pattern by making coalition governance the baseline expectation rather than an anomaly.
The provision remains ambitious. But with 6-year terms under CMF conditions, it transitions from "forcing a president to work with the enemy's people" to "maintaining institutional continuity across coalition transitions" -- a description that matches how every other advanced democracy operates.
Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework (Title III, Section 504A)¶
The override framework is new in Rev 1.3 and represents one of the most significant institutional innovations in the CSAA. Professional merit panels recommend candidates for SPS positions based on qualifications and competence. Political leaders retain authority to override recommendations, but overrides require written justification and trigger automatic escalation to strengthened Inspectors General and relevant congressional oversight committees.
Under current conditions, the override framework functions adequately but faces pressure from the same partisan dynamics that affect other provisions. A president who overrides merit panel recommendations for ideological reasons faces IG review and congressional scrutiny -- but if the president's party controls both chambers, congressional scrutiny may be toothless. The framework depends on at least one accountability channel functioning independently.
Under CMF conditions, all three accountability channels -- documentation requirements, IG review, and congressional oversight -- operate more effectively. The documentation requirement functions identically regardless of congressional structure. But the IG channel benefits from coalition governance because IGs under the CSAA serve fixed 7-year terms with for-cause removal protections -- and a coalition Congress is more likely to enforce those protections than a single-party Congress aligned with the president. The congressional oversight channel transforms most dramatically: the OCP's proportional procedural allocation ensures that parties outside the governing coalition have committee positions and institutional capacity to scrutinize override decisions. When an override escalation reaches a committee where multiple party groups have representation, the political cost of transparently partisan overrides increases substantially.
The triangulated accountability structure -- documentation, IG review, and congressional escalation -- is designed to ensure that at least one channel provides meaningful accountability even if others are compromised. Under CMF conditions, all three channels are more likely to function simultaneously, making the framework robust rather than merely adequate.
For-Cause Removal Protections (Title IV)¶
The CSAA establishes that SPS officers may be removed for incompetence, neglect of duty, malfeasance, refusal to execute lawful directives, ethics violations, or criminal conduct -- but not for policy disagreement, political affiliation, or unwelcome professional advice. The design imposes procedural requirements and political costs on arbitrary removal without absolutely prohibiting presidential removal authority.
Under current conditions, the for-cause standard faces two pressures. First, presidents accustomed to "at pleasure" authority over senior officials resist any constraints on removal. Second, the hyper-partisan environment creates constant pressure to purge officials perceived as insufficiently loyal -- the "deep state" narrative generates political incentive to fire career officials for ideological reasons.
Under CMF conditions, both pressures diminish. The coalition dynamic reduces the political reward for purging officials. When a president governs through a multi-party coalition, firing a competent Deputy Secretary to install a loyalist generates pushback not just from the opposition but from coalition partners who view professional administration as protecting their negotiated policy priorities. The "deep state" narrative itself loses potency in an environment where governance is demonstrably collaborative rather than zero-sum.
Additionally, the OCP's transparency mechanisms create institutional documentation of removal attempts. The quarterly Procedural Transparency Reports -- designed to document departures from procedural norms -- create a model for executive branch transparency. If the CSAA's transparency portal records removal actions and justifications while the OCP publishes congressional oversight findings, arbitrary removals become politically costly across multiple institutional channels simultaneously.
The structured severability provision in Rev 1.3 strengthens this analysis. For-cause removal protections are drafted as self-contained legislative units, so even if one tier's protections face constitutional challenge, other tiers continue to operate independently. Under CMF conditions, the political appetite for constitutional challenges to removal protections decreases because coalition partners have shared institutional interest in maintaining professional insulation.
The constitutional analysis remains unchanged -- for-cause protections face judicial scrutiny regardless of congressional structure. But the political environment that determines whether removal protections are tested in practice transforms significantly. Presidents facing coalition governance have less incentive to push removal boundaries, and Congress has more institutional capacity to push back when they do.
Revolving Door Restrictions (Title VIII)¶
The CSAA's 5-year revolving door restrictions -- covering lobbying, employment with regulated entities, and employment with contractors -- represent some of the most aggressive ethics provisions in any modern civil service proposal. The restrictions are paired with enforcement mechanisms including $250,000 civil penalties, criminal prosecution, pension forfeiture, and disgorgement of prohibited compensation.
Under current conditions, revolving door restrictions face sustained lobbying pressure for weakening or exemption. Industries that benefit from hiring former government officials invest heavily in maintaining permissive post-employment rules. The two-party system enables this because each party's donor base includes entities that benefit from the revolving door.
Under CMF conditions, the political economy of revolving door enforcement improves in two ways. First, multi-party representation dilutes the influence of any single industry's lobbying effort. When five or six party groups participate in governance, no single industry can capture enough political relationships to systematically weaken enforcement. The diversified power structure makes it harder to assemble the legislative coalition needed to carve out exemptions. Second, smaller parties that emerge under proportional representation often build their identity on anti-corruption platforms. These parties have strong electoral incentive to champion revolving door enforcement and publicize violations. Their proportional representation in committees and floor time ensures they have institutional capacity to maintain oversight pressure.
The OCP's transparency infrastructure reinforces this dynamic. If revolving door violations are documented through the CSAA's public database and OGE tracking system, and if the OCP's proportional procedural allocation ensures that anti-corruption-oriented parties have committee positions and floor time to highlight violations, the enforcement environment becomes self-reinforcing. Violations get publicized by parties with electoral incentive to publicize them, through institutional channels that cannot be suppressed by a single majority party.
Congressional Oversight and Accountability Mechanisms (Title VII)¶
The CSAA builds its accountability architecture on congressional engagement: mandatory testimony, committee oversight, Inspector General reporting, public performance reviews, and -- new in Rev 1.3 -- automatic escalation routing from the override framework to congressional committees. These mechanisms require a Congress that treats oversight as a governance function rather than a partisan weapon.
This is perhaps the area where the CMF produces the most dramatic improvement. Under current conditions, congressional oversight is largely performative. Hearings are staged confrontations designed for cable news clips. Committee chairs use oversight authority to harass political opponents and protect allies. The substantive function of oversight -- evaluating whether government programs are working and public officials are performing -- is subordinated to partisan messaging.
Under CMF conditions, oversight transforms structurally. The OCP distributes committee leadership proportionally, meaning oversight committees are chaired by members from multiple party groups across the congressional landscape. No single party controls which oversight investigations proceed and which are buried. The proportional floor time allocation ensures that oversight findings -- including findings uncomfortable for the administration -- receive public legislative attention.
When the CSAA requires SPS officers to testify before Congress and provide annual written reports, the quality of that interaction depends entirely on the institutional incentives of the members conducting oversight. In a coalition Congress, members from junior coalition parties have strong incentive to conduct genuine oversight because it demonstrates their contribution to governance quality -- their voters sent them to Congress to ensure accountability, not to rubber-stamp a majority party's agenda. The OCP ensures these members have the procedural tools to conduct meaningful oversight rather than being procedurally marginalized.
The automatic escalation routing from the override framework amplifies this dynamic. When a political leader overrides a professional recommendation, the escalation filing reaches congressional committees where multiple party groups have representation and procedural capacity to investigate. Under current conditions, such escalations might be buried by a committee chair aligned with the president. Under CMF conditions, the distributed committee structure makes suppression structurally difficult.
The CSAA's public performance review system benefits similarly. When performance evaluations incorporate input from Congress, those evaluations are only as credible as the congressional participation is genuine. In a multi-party oversight environment, performance reviews reflect diverse perspectives rather than binary partisan judgments. An SPS officer rated "Outstanding" by a broad coalition of committee members carries more institutional credibility than one rated highly by a single party's committee majority.
Bipartisan Balance Requirements (Title III)¶
The CSAA requires that no more than 60% of CS-1 and CS-2 positions across the executive branch be held by individuals affiliated with a single political party. CS-3 positions are subject to transparency-only monitoring. This provision prevents any administration from stacking senior career positions.
Under current conditions, "bipartisan" means balancing between two parties -- a constraint that feels artificial when both parties are deeply polarized. The 60% cap essentially means a 60-40 split between the president's party and the opposition, which may generate resentment without genuine ideological diversity.
Under CMF conditions, the balance requirement becomes both more natural and more meaningful. When the political landscape includes multiple parties, the 60% cap ensures representation from a broader ideological spectrum. A CS-1 and CS-2 corps that includes professionals affiliated with center-right, center-left, and centrist parties provides genuinely diverse institutional perspectives rather than a binary partisan split. The balance requirement transitions from an artificial constraint to a reflection of the actual political diversity that CMF produces in the electorate and legislature.
Furthermore, in a multi-party environment, the balance requirement aligns with coalition governance norms. Coalition governments routinely distribute senior appointments across participating parties. The CSAA's balance requirement for career positions mirrors this practice for professional appointments, creating institutional coherence between how coalition governance distributes political power and how the professional civil service reflects political diversity.
The extension of the hard balance cap to CS-2 positions in Rev 1.3 (previously applicable only to CS-1) reinforces this dynamic. With committee confirmation for CS-2, the balance requirement ensures that the broader SPS leadership reflects political diversity, while CS-3 positions -- selected by merit panels without political confirmation -- are monitored for balance but not constrained by hard caps, preserving the primacy of professional qualifications at that tier.
Merit-Based Selection and Promotion (Title V)¶
The CSAA establishes competitive examination, performance evaluation, and merit-based advancement as the foundation of the professional civil service. Promotion boards of senior civil servants evaluate candidates using standardized criteria: performance evaluations (40%), professional development (20%), competitive assessment (30%), and promotion board interview (10%).
These mechanisms are less directly affected by congressional structure than other provisions, but the CMF strengthens them indirectly. Under current conditions, merit systems face constant pressure from political actors seeking to place loyalists. The current administration's efforts to reclassify career positions as political appointments (Schedule F) demonstrate how fragile merit protections can be when a single party views the civil service as territory to be captured.
Under CMF conditions, the political incentive to undermine merit systems diminishes. No single party expects to capture all government appointments, so the strategic value of converting career positions to political ones declines. Coalition partners actively resist such conversions because they threaten the professional administration that protects everyone's policy priorities. The merit system becomes a shared institutional asset rather than an obstacle to partisan control.
Whistleblower Protections (Title VII, Section 304)¶
The CSAA provides comprehensive whistleblower protection: disclosure channels to IGs, OSC, Congress, GAO, and DOJ; remedies including reinstatement, back pay, and compensatory damages; and criminal penalties for disclosing whistleblower identity.
Under current conditions, whistleblower protections are only as strong as the institutional willingness to enforce them. When a single party controls both chambers and the presidency, whistleblowers who report problems embarrassing to the ruling party face political headwinds despite legal protections. Committee chairs may decline to investigate. Leadership may bury reports.
Under CMF conditions, whistleblowers gain institutional allies across the political spectrum. The OCP's proportional procedural allocation ensures that parties outside the governing coalition have committee positions, floor time, and oversight capacity. A whistleblower's disclosure reaches not just a single majority party's committee structure but a distributed oversight environment where multiple party groups have incentive and institutional capacity to investigate. The confidential discharge petition mechanism provides an additional pathway -- if leadership buries a whistleblower investigation, a cross-party coalition can force floor consideration.
The political economy of whistleblower protection reverses: under current conditions, protecting whistleblowers is costly for the majority and beneficial for the opposition, creating unstable protection that depends on which party holds power. Under CMF conditions, protecting whistleblowers serves the institutional interests of multiple party groups simultaneously, creating durable protection grounded in diversified self-interest rather than vulnerable single-party commitment.
The Compounding Effect: Professionalized Legislature Plus Professionalized Executive¶
The provision-level analysis demonstrates that each CSAA mechanism functions better under CMF conditions. But the interaction between the two frameworks produces compounding benefits that exceed the sum of individual provision improvements.
The CMF professionalizes how laws are made. The CSAA professionalizes how laws are executed. Together, they create a governance chain where policy moves from coalition negotiation through professional legislative procedure through competent professional implementation -- each link reinforcing the others.
Professional legislative procedure produces better-crafted legislation because multiple party perspectives are incorporated during drafting, committee consideration, and floor debate. Better-crafted legislation is easier for professional civil servants to implement because ambiguities and contradictions are reduced during the legislative process. Competent implementation produces policy outcomes that validate the coalition governance model, strengthening political support for both the professional legislature and the professional executive.
This creates a positive feedback loop: functional governance demonstrates the value of professional institutions, which builds public support for maintaining those institutions, which sustains the political environment in which they operate. The alternative -- the current negative feedback loop where dysfunction breeds cynicism, cynicism breeds disengagement, and disengagement enables further dysfunction -- is precisely what both frameworks are designed to interrupt.
The Rev 1.3 innovations -- the override framework, strengthened IGs, automatic escalation routing, and structured severability -- multiply the compounding effect. The override framework creates a direct institutional bridge between executive branch accountability and congressional oversight. Strengthened IGs serve as an independent accountability channel that functions across political configurations. Automatic escalation ensures that congressional oversight is activated structurally rather than depending on the political will of individual committee chairs. And structured severability ensures that the institutional architecture degrades gracefully rather than catastrophically, preserving compounding benefits even if individual provisions face legal challenge.
Strategic Sequencing¶
The CSAA can be enacted at any time. It does not require the CMF as a legislative prerequisite. However, the analysis in this document suggests optimal sequencing considerations.
The CMF's electoral reforms (FEMA) create multi-party conditions within approximately two election cycles. The OCP's procedural reforms phase in over 5-10 years, with acceleration triggers responsive to multi-party conditions. The CSAA's own implementation timeline spans 8 years.
If the CMF is enacted first or simultaneously, the CSAA's 8-year implementation period overlaps with the CMF's institutional maturation. By the time the CSAA reaches full implementation -- all positions converted, all SPS officers confirmed through tiered confirmation, all accountability mechanisms operational -- the congressional environment will have evolved toward the coalition governance model under which the CSAA performs optimally.
If the CSAA is enacted before the CMF, it faces a more challenging implementation environment during the early phases but remains viable. The 8-year phased implementation provides buffer time during which the CMF could be enacted and begin producing multi-party conditions. The CSAA's design is robust enough to survive initial implementation under two-party conditions, even if it achieves its full potential only under coalition governance. The structured severability provision provides additional resilience -- even if early-phase constitutional challenges succeed against individual provisions, the remaining architecture continues to function.
The strongest case is for parallel advocacy: the CSAA and CMF as complementary components of a comprehensive governance modernization agenda, each reinforcing the case for the other. The CSAA demonstrates that executive branch professionalization is feasible and desirable, building support for the congressional modernization that makes it fully effective. The CMF demonstrates that legislative professionalization is feasible and desirable, building support for the executive branch professionalization that completes the governance chain.
Conclusion¶
The Civil Service Accountability Act is designed to work. The Congressional Modernization Framework is designed to make it work better.
Every major CSAA provision -- the evidence-based appointee cap, tiered confirmation, career Deputy Secretaries, the professional recommendation and override framework, for-cause removal, revolving door restrictions, congressional oversight with automatic escalation, bipartisan balance, merit selection, and whistleblower protection -- functions more effectively in the multi-party, coalition-based congressional environment that the CMF produces. The interaction is not one of dependency but of institutional reinforcement: each framework addresses a different dimension of American governance dysfunction, and together they create conditions under which professional, accountable, competent government becomes structurally sustainable rather than perpetually vulnerable to partisan capture.
The CSAA without the CMF is ambitious reform in a hostile environment. The CSAA with the CMF is institutional engineering optimized for the governance conditions it requires. Both are worth pursuing. Together, they represent what American government could be: professional where it needs to be professional, democratic where it needs to be democratic, and accountable throughout.
Revision History¶
Revision 1.3 (Current) - Updated to reflect CSAA Rev 1.3 legislative text - Revised appointee cap section: replaced 0.2% formula (~420) with 1.25% of senior policy and management workforce (~1,000); added three-tranche conversion analysis - Replaced Senate confirmation section with tiered confirmation analysis (CS-1 full Senate, CS-2 committee with default approval, CS-3 merit panel) - Updated Deputy Secretary term length from 10 years to 6 years throughout - Added new section: Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework with CMF interaction analysis - Added structured severability discussion to for-cause removal and compounding effect sections - Updated bipartisan balance section to reflect extended hard cap to CS-2 and transparency-only monitoring for CS-3 - Updated congressional oversight section to include automatic escalation routing from override framework - Added Rev 1.3 innovations to compounding effect analysis - Updated strategic sequencing for structured severability resilience - Updated conclusion to reflect new mechanisms
Revision 1.0 - Initial publication as CSAA strategic sequencing and institutional interaction analysis - Provision-by-provision analysis of CMF impact on CSAA effectiveness - Strategic sequencing recommendations for parallel advocacy
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Prepared by Albert Ramos for The American Policy Architecture Institute