Civil Service Accountability Act¶

Constitutional and Legal Analysis¶

Published February 2026¶

Based on Rev 1.3 of the Civil Service Accountability Act

Overview¶

This document analyzes the constitutional and legal foundations of the Civil Service Accountability Act (CSAA), hereafter referred to as "the Act."

The Act's constitutional design rests on well-established precedents and carefully preserves presidential authority while creating professional civil service. This analysis addresses six key questions: congressional authority to establish the Act's structure, presidential authority under Article II, precedents supporting fixed terms and for-cause removal, the constitutionality of tiered confirmation, the constitutional position of the Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework, and the structured severability architecture that ensures graceful degradation under judicial challenge.

Rev 1.3 strengthens the Act's constitutional position in several respects. Shorter term lengths (6/5 years versus the original 10/8) reduce the distance from existing fixed-term precedents. Tiered confirmation matches the constitutional burden to each tier's political significance. The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework operates through documentation and transparency rather than constraints on presidential authority. And the structured severability architecture ensures that no single adverse ruling collapses the reform framework.

This analysis also engages directly with the current Supreme Court trajectory, which has narrowed removal-protection precedents through Seila Law v. CFPB (2020) and Collins v. Yellen (2021). The Act is designed not merely to survive current doctrine but to present a constitutional profile that the Court would have to dismantle provision by provision, each on independent grounds.

Congressional Authority¶

Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 grants Congress authority "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" federal powers. This includes authority to establish civil service structures. The Necessary and Proper Clause has been interpreted broadly to enable Congress to create administrative structures supporting constitutional functions.

Historical precedent firmly establishes this authority:

Pendleton Act of 1883: Established merit-based civil service
Classification Act of 1923: Created structured position grades
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Reorganized civil service systems

Each represented major congressional restructuring of executive branch employment. Constitutional challenges to these acts failed. The Act represents the next evolution of congressionally-established civil service structures.

Congress also possesses authority to prescribe qualifications for offices, establish appointment procedures, and impose removal standards within constitutional limits. The Appointments Clause (Article II, Section 2, Clause 2) explicitly grants Congress authority over inferior officers: "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." This includes authority to structure these offices, establish qualifications, and prescribe procedures.

Article I as Constitutional Foundation¶

The Act's constitutional defense is best understood not as a constraint on presidential Article II power but as an exercise of Congress's Article I authority to structure executive departments. Congress creates departments, establishes offices, sets qualifications, appropriates funds, and prescribes organizational structures. The Act operates within this established domain.

This framing matters because the unitary executive debate -- which dominates current Supreme Court jurisprudence on removal power -- assumes a conflict between congressional restrictions and presidential authority. But most of the Act's provisions do not engage this conflict at all. Transparency requirements, documentation mandates, merit selection criteria, professional qualification standards, revolving door restrictions, and congressional oversight mechanisms all fall squarely within Congress's undisputed Article I authority to structure the departments it creates and funds.

The provisions that do engage Article II questions -- for-cause removal protections and fixed terms -- are supported by extensive precedent and designed with structural resilience. But even if those provisions were struck entirely, the Article I foundation would sustain the Act's core reform architecture.

Presidential Authority Preserved¶

The Act carefully preserves presidential authority under Article II while creating professional civil service. Three aspects of presidential power are particularly relevant: appointment authority, removal authority, and executive power generally.

Appointment Power¶

The Act preserves presidential appointment power through a tiered confirmation structure that matches the constitutional mechanism to each tier's political significance. For CS-1 positions (Deputy Secretary equivalent), the President nominates from panel-recommended candidates and the full Senate confirms -- tracking the standard Article II design for principal officers. For CS-2 positions (Undersecretary equivalent), committee confirmation with a 60-day default approval mechanism provides oversight without creating floor-level partisan confrontation. For CS-3 positions (Assistant Secretary equivalent), professional merit panels select officers consistent with existing career SES selection processes.

At every tier, presidential discretion over nominations is preserved. The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework establishes that merit panels recommend candidates, but the President (for CS-1) or agency head (for CS-2 and CS-3) retains authority to override recommendations with documented justification. The override requirement imposes transparency, not prohibition.

Removal Authority¶

The Act preserves presidential removal authority while imposing for-cause standards and procedural requirements. The President can remove SPS officers for incompetence, misconduct, failure to execute lawful directives, ethical violations, or criminal conduct. These grounds cover legitimate bases for removal while preventing arbitrary political purges.

Importantly, the Act imposes political costs and procedural requirements for removal, not absolute prohibitions. The President must provide written justification, give notice and opportunity to respond, and face potential appeals -- but ultimate removal authority remains. This design mirrors other constitutionally-upheld removal restrictions.

The revised term lengths strengthen this position. Six-year CS-1 terms and five-year CS-2 terms are shorter than the FBI Director's 10-year term, the Federal Reserve Governors' 14-year terms, and the Comptroller General's 15-year term -- all of which have operated for decades without successful constitutional challenge. Shorter terms reduce the constitutional attack surface under unitary executive arguments by ensuring every presidential term includes at least one appointment cycle at each tier.

Executive Power¶

The Act does not diminish general executive power. Cabinet Secretaries -- the President's direct subordinates -- remain political appointees serving at pleasure. They set policy direction and make final decisions on major initiatives. The President retains authority to supervise executive branch operations, require written opinions from principal officers, and direct policy implementation. Section 304(e) of the Act explicitly provides: "Nothing in this Act shall diminish the President's constitutional authority under Article II to supervise the executive branch, require written opinions from principal officers, or remove officers subject to constitutional limitations."

Professional civil servants execute presidential directives -- they do not set policy independently. When Presidents lawfully direct policy changes, professional civil servants implement those changes regardless of personal views. Professional protection enables resistance to unlawful directives but not resistance to unpopular directives. The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework reinforces this principle: the politically accountable Cabinet Secretary makes the final call on discretionary matters, while the professional officer's expertise is documented and cannot be silently ignored.

Supreme Court Precedents¶

Multiple Supreme Court precedents support the Act's constitutional design. The analysis below addresses both the precedents favoring the Act and the recent decisions that have narrowed removal-protection doctrine.

Humphrey's Executor v. United States (1935)¶

Upheld for-cause removal protections for Federal Trade Commission members. The Court held that Congress can impose removal restrictions for positions requiring independence from direct political control. While distinguishing "purely executive" positions from "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial" positions, the Court established that some removal restrictions are constitutional.

The Act's relevance: SPS officers perform operational, technical, and administrative functions requiring professional expertise and continuity -- functions analogous to the independent judgment that Humphrey's Executor protected. The Act does not claim that career civil servants are "quasi-legislative" or "quasi-judicial," but rather that Congress has authority to structure professional service within the executive branch.

Morrison v. Olson (1988)¶

Upheld for-cause removal provisions for independent counsel. The Court held that removal restrictions do not violate separation of powers if they do not "impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty." The test is whether restrictions interfere with presidential functions, not whether they impose any constraint.

The Act's relevance: For-cause removal with broad grounds (incompetence, misconduct, failure to execute lawful directives, ethical violations, criminal conduct) does not impede the President's ability to perform constitutional duties. The President can remove any SPS officer who fails to execute lawful orders. The procedural requirements ensure accountability for removal decisions but do not prohibit removal for legitimate reasons.

Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB (2010)¶

Struck down "double for-cause" removal restrictions (President could remove SEC commissioners only for cause, who could remove PCAOB members only for cause). However, the Court explicitly reaffirmed that single-layer for-cause removal is constitutional. The Act imposes only single-layer removal restrictions -- the President removes SPS officers for cause, with no intermediate layer of insulated officials standing between the President and the removal decision.

Seila Law v. CFPB (2020)¶

Struck down removal restrictions for the single director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. The Court held that an agency led by a single individual wielding "vast rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority" with "no colleagues to moderate her views" created constitutional problems distinct from multi-member bodies.

The Act's relevance: The Act creates a multi-member professional service with hundreds of officers across agencies -- not a single director wielding concentrated power. Each SPS officer operates within a defined domain under Cabinet Secretary supervision, not independently controlling an entire agency. The specific constitutional infirmity identified in Seila Law -- one person, insulated from removal, exercising comprehensive governmental authority without collegial check -- does not arise in the Act's design.

Collins v. Yellen (2021)¶

Extended Seila Law to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, again striking removal restrictions for a single-director agency structure. The Court reaffirmed that the single-director problem was central to its reasoning, not removal restrictions generally.

The Act's relevance: Collins reinforces the distinction between single-director agencies and multi-member structures. The Act's SPS does not create any single-director positions; it creates professional officers embedded within existing department structures under the supervision of politically appointed Cabinet Secretaries.

Honest Assessment: The Court's Trajectory¶

The trend line from Humphrey's Executor through Morrison v. Olson to Seila Law and Collins v. Yellen shows a Court increasingly sympathetic to unitary executive arguments. Justice Thomas has explicitly called for reconsidering Humphrey's Executor. The Court's current majority has demonstrated willingness to narrow removal-protection precedents, and future cases may further constrain Congress's authority to insulate executive branch officers from presidential removal.

The Act's constitutional design acknowledges this trajectory rather than ignoring it. Three features of the design respond directly to the Court's direction:

First, the Act avoids the structural features the Court has targeted. No single directors with concentrated power. No double layers of for-cause protection. No independent agencies operating outside presidential supervision. SPS officers serve within departments under Cabinet Secretaries who serve at the President's pleasure.

Second, the Act's for-cause removal grounds are deliberately broad. Incompetence, misconduct, failure to execute lawful directives, ethical violations, and criminal conduct cover virtually any legitimate basis for removal. These grounds do not create the functional equivalent of tenure -- they prevent only arbitrary removal untethered to any performance or conduct rationale.

Third, the structured severability architecture ensures that even aggressive judicial rulings do not collapse the reform framework. This is not an admission of constitutional weakness but a recognition that constitutional doctrine evolves and responsible statutory design accounts for multiple judicial outcomes.

Tiered Confirmation and the Appointments Clause¶

Rev 1.3 introduces a tiered confirmation structure that requires separate constitutional analysis for each tier.

The Appointments Clause Framework¶

Article II, Section 2 distinguishes between "Officers of the United States" (principal officers) who must be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, and "inferior Officers" whose appointment Congress may vest "in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." The constitutional question for each SPS tier is whether its appointment mechanism satisfies the Appointments Clause.

CS-1: Full Senate Confirmation¶

CS-1 officers (Deputy Secretary equivalent) receive full Senate confirmation following presidential nomination. This mechanism tracks the standard Article II design for principal officers and raises no Appointments Clause concerns. The President nominates from panel-recommended candidates, but retains authority to override panel recommendations with documented justification. The professional recommendation process constrains neither the President's nomination discretion nor the Senate's confirmation authority.

CS-2: Committee Confirmation with Default Approval¶

CS-2 officers (Undersecretary equivalent) receive committee confirmation with a 60-day default approval mechanism -- confirmed unless the relevant committee votes to reject within 60 legislative days. This raises two constitutional questions: whether committee confirmation satisfies the "Advice and Consent of the Senate" requirement, and whether CS-2 officers are principal or inferior officers.

If CS-2 officers are inferior officers, Congress has broad discretion under the Appointments Clause to vest their appointment in department heads, the President alone, or the courts -- and committee confirmation exceeds the constitutional minimum. The question is whether officers at the Undersecretary equivalent level are "inferior" within the meaning of the Clause.

The Supreme Court's analysis in Edmond v. United States (1997) held that inferior officers are those "whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate." CS-2 officers are supervised by CS-1 officers (who receive full Senate confirmation) and by Cabinet Secretaries (who serve at the President's pleasure). This supervisory structure supports classification as inferior officers.

If CS-2 officers are classified as principal officers requiring full Senate confirmation, the committee confirmation mechanism would need to be understood as a procedural structure within the Senate's own advice-and-consent function -- the Senate establishing, by statute, a streamlined process for a category of nominations. The default approval mechanism operates as a Senate rule governing how the chamber processes nominations, not as an exclusion of the Senate from the confirmation process. The Senate retains the ability to reject any CS-2 nominee through committee vote.

The Act's structured severability addresses this uncertainty directly. If committee confirmation for CS-2 is held to violate the Appointments Clause, the professional merit panel selection mechanism activates as a fallback for CS-2 positions, and the remainder of the Act continues to operate.

CS-3: Merit Panel Selection¶

CS-3 officers (Assistant Secretary equivalent) are selected by professional merit panels with no Senate involvement, consistent with existing career SES selection processes. This mechanism is constitutional if CS-3 officers are inferior officers whose appointment Congress has vested in the heads of departments -- which is precisely what the Act does. Agency heads select nominees in consultation with OPM from panel-recommended candidates.

CS-3 officers are supervised by CS-2 officers, CS-1 officers, and Cabinet Secretaries. Their functions are operational and technical rather than policy-making. They lead specific bureaus or program areas within departments, exercising authority subject to multiple layers of supervision by Senate-confirmed officials. Under Edmond, this supervisory structure firmly supports inferior officer classification.

The career SES precedent is instructive. Since 1978, the Senior Executive Service has operated with merit-based selection for career positions without Senate confirmation. This system has never been successfully challenged on Appointments Clause grounds, and the Act's CS-3 selection process mirrors its structure.

The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework¶

The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework is the Act's mechanism for resolving the gray area between clear lawful directives and bright-line illegality -- the vast domain of regulatory discretion, policy interpretation, and professional judgment where reasonable people disagree. Its constitutional position is strong because it operates through documentation and transparency rather than through constraints on presidential authority.

Constitutional Design¶

The framework preserves complete political override authority. Cabinet Secretaries and equivalent political appointees retain full authority to accept, modify, or reject professional recommendations. No SPS officer can prevent a Cabinet Secretary from making a discretionary decision. The framework requires only that overrides be documented in writing with the political leadership's justification, and that both the recommendation and override become part of the public record.

This design imposes transparency, not prohibition. The First Amendment implications of compelled government speech are not at issue because the documentation requirements apply to official governmental decision-making, not private expression. Congress routinely requires executive branch officials to document and justify decisions -- the Administrative Procedure Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and numerous agency-specific statutes all impose analogous requirements.

Structured Escalation¶

The escalation pathway -- through which an SPS officer who believes an override will cause genuine harm can file a structured escalation to the Inspector General, relevant congressional committee, and the administrative record -- does not constrain presidential authority. Filing an escalation does not constitute insubordination, does not require the officer to refuse execution of the override, and does not prevent the override from taking effect. It creates an informational channel, not a veto.

Congressional oversight of executive branch operations is a core Article I function. The escalation pathway's automatic routing of override records to relevant committees is an extension of Congress's oversight authority, not an intrusion on Article II power. The executive branch remains free to override professional recommendations; Congress is informed of those overrides; and the public record is preserved for democratic accountability.

Constitutional Exposure¶

The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework is among the Act's constitutionally unexposed provisions. It does not constrain presidential removal power. It does not prohibit any executive action. It constrains only secrecy -- requiring that discretionary decisions be documented and justified on the record. Even under the most aggressive unitary executive interpretation of Article II, it is difficult to construct a constitutional objection to requirements that executive officials document their reasoning for departing from professional advice.

Existing Fixed-Term Precedents¶

Several existing federal positions operate with fixed terms and for-cause removal protections that have been upheld or never successfully challenged:

Position	Term Length	Statutory Authority
FBI Director	10 years	28 U.S.C. Section 532
Federal Reserve Governors	14 years	12 U.S.C. Section 242
Comptroller General	15 years	31 U.S.C. Section 703

The Act's revised term lengths -- 6 years for CS-1 and 5 years for CS-2 -- are shorter than all three existing precedents. This strengthens the constitutional position: if 10-year and 14-year terms are constitutional, 6-year and 5-year terms present a lesser constraint on presidential authority. Career CS-3 positions parallel the existing career SES, which has operated since 1978 without constitutional challenge.

Military Officer Precedent¶

Military officers serve fixed terms for senior positions, face Senate confirmation for flag rank, and enjoy due process protections against arbitrary removal. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs serves a 4-year term (renewable once). This structure closely parallels the Act's design for senior civil servants and has operated since the founding without constitutional objection.

The Act's explicit modeling on military officer structure is constitutionally significant. The military precedent demonstrates that fixed-term, Senate-confirmed professionals can serve democratic leadership effectively while maintaining institutional independence -- and can do so within the executive branch, under presidential command authority, with for-cause removal protections.

Constitutional Design Features¶

The Act's design incorporates lessons from the full arc of removal-power precedents, from Humphrey's Executor through Collins v. Yellen:

Presidential Appointment Power Preserved: The President nominates CS-1 officers for full Senate confirmation. CS-2 and CS-3 appointment mechanisms preserve executive branch involvement at every tier while matching the constitutional procedure to the tier's political significance.

Presidential Removal Authority Maintained: The President can remove for cause -- incompetence, misconduct, failure to execute lawful directives, ethical violations, criminal conduct. These broad grounds enable removal of any officer who fails to perform or to execute lawful orders, while preventing arbitrary political purges.

Procedural Requirements, Not Prohibitions: Written justification, notice and opportunity to respond, and appeal rights impose political costs and procedural requirements but do not absolutely prohibit removal. The President faces consequences for arbitrary removal, encouraging proper use of removal authority.

Multi-Member SPS, Not Single Directors: The Act creates a professional service with hundreds of officers across agencies, not single directors wielding concentrated power. This avoids the constitutional problems identified in Seila Law and Collins v. Yellen.

Supervision by Senate-Confirmed Officials: SPS officers at every tier are supervised by Cabinet Secretaries who serve at the President's pleasure. The chain of command runs from the President through political appointees to professional officers -- preserving the hierarchical accountability structure that the unitary executive theory demands.

Limited to Appropriate Functions: Professional civil service covers administrative, operational, and technical functions requiring expertise and continuity. Policy-making positions remain political appointments. The Act's 1.25% formula retains approximately 1,000 political appointments for positions requiring political judgment.

Shorter Terms Than Existing Precedents: Six-year CS-1 and five-year CS-2 terms are shorter than the FBI Director (10 years), Federal Reserve Governors (14 years), and Comptroller General (15 years). Each presidential term includes at least one appointment cycle at every tier.

Constitutionally Unexposed Core: The Act's most transformative provisions -- transparency requirements, documentation mandates, merit selection criteria, professional qualification standards, revolving door restrictions, and congressional oversight mechanisms -- operate entirely within Congress's Article I authority and do not engage contested Article II questions.

Structured Severability Architecture¶

The Act's constitutional resilience is enhanced through structured severability -- a design philosophy that goes beyond a generic severability clause. Generic severability provisions state that if any provision is held invalid, the remainder continues in force. The Act's structured severability goes further by drafting each tier's protections as self-contained constitutional units with explicit fallback provisions and by identifying constitutionally unexposed provisions that function as the reform framework's load-bearing walls.

Tier-Specific Independence¶

Each SPS tier (CS-1, CS-2, CS-3) is designed as a self-contained constitutional unit. The protections, requirements, and procedures applicable to each tier operate independently. Critically, each tier's removal protections rest on distinct constitutional foundations:

CS-1 protections are grounded in full Senate confirmation, creating the strongest democratic legitimacy for for-cause removal restrictions. CS-2 protections are grounded in committee confirmation with default approval, a lighter-touch mechanism that presents a correspondingly smaller constitutional target. CS-3 protections are grounded in professional merit panel selection consistent with existing career SES processes that have operated for decades without constitutional challenge.

Invalidation of protections at one tier does not affect protections at other tiers. This is not merely a statement of legislative intent -- it reflects the structural reality that each tier rests on different constitutional foundations and can be evaluated independently.

Explicit Fallback Provisions¶

For the most constitutionally exposed provisions, the Act includes operative fallback clauses:

If for-cause removal protections for CS-1 officers are invalidated, CS-1 officers remain subject to fixed terms, Senate confirmation, professional recommendation documentation requirements, Transparency Portal publication, and all other provisions not dependent on the invalidated provision. The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework continues in full force.

If fixed terms for CS-1 officers are invalidated, merit selection requirements, professional qualification standards, documentation mandates, revolving door restrictions, and all accountability and transparency provisions remain operative.

If both for-cause removal protections and fixed terms for CS-1 officers are struck, the Transparency Portal, the Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework, all documentation requirements, congressional oversight mechanisms, merit selection criteria, revolving door restrictions, performance evaluation systems, and the bipartisan balance requirement continue to operate independently.

If for-cause removal protections for Inspectors General are invalidated, IG merit-based selection, fixed terms, documentation requirements, and all provisions of the triangulated accountability framework not dependent on IG for-cause removal protections remain operative.

Constitutionally Unexposed Provisions¶

The following provisions face essentially zero unitary executive constitutional exposure because they do not constrain presidential removal power -- they constrain only secrecy, impose documentation requirements, or establish professional standards:

Transparency requirements and documentation mandates
Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework, including all documentation and publication requirements
Revolving door restrictions
Merit selection criteria and professional qualification standards
Congressional oversight and reporting requirements
Public performance review system
Standing position evaluation function
Political appointment quantitative limits and categorical framework
Ethics requirements
Non-partisan service requirements

These provisions are designed as the load-bearing walls of the Act. Even under a worst-case judicial scenario that strikes all removal protections and fixed terms, a functioning reform framework built on transparency, documentation, merit, and oversight remains fully operative.

Vulnerability Assessment¶

An honest assessment of constitutional vulnerability, from most exposed to least exposed:

Most Exposed: For-cause removal protections for CS-1 officers. As the highest-ranking SPS positions with the closest proximity to presidential authority, these protections face the strongest unitary executive challenge. However, the multi-member structure (hundreds of officers, not a single director), broad removal grounds, and shorter terms (6 years versus existing 10-14 year precedents) all distinguish the Act from the single-director agencies struck down in Seila Law and Collins.

Moderately Exposed: Fixed terms for CS-1 officers. Fixed terms have survived constitutional challenge across multiple contexts (FBI Director, Federal Reserve Governors, Comptroller General, military officers), but the current Court's sympathies may extend to questioning even established practices if they significantly constrain presidential authority over senior executive officials.

Low Exposure: For-cause removal and fixed terms for CS-2 officers. Committee confirmation creates a lighter democratic legitimacy argument, but CS-2 officers are further from presidential authority and subject to supervision by CS-1 officers and Cabinet Secretaries. The inferior officer classification strengthens the constitutional position.

Minimal Exposure: CS-3 protections. Career appointments through merit panels mirror existing career SES processes operating since 1978 without constitutional challenge. CS-3 officers are supervised by multiple layers of Senate-confirmed officials.

Essentially Zero Exposure: All transparency, documentation, merit selection, oversight, revolving door, and reporting provisions. These operate within Congress's Article I authority and do not engage Article II removal questions.

Design Principle¶

The Act is designed so that a court must strike provisions one at a time, each on independent constitutional grounds. No single adverse ruling collapses the framework. Each layer of protection adds value independently, not only in combination. The architecture ensures graceful degradation rather than framework collapse, preserving the maximum reform benefit under any plausible judicial outcome.

Responding to Constitutional Challenges¶

The Act will likely face constitutional challenges arguing that fixed terms and for-cause removal violate Article II presidential authority. The response operates on three levels.

First Line of Defense: Precedent¶

The Act's design is supported by extensive precedent:

FBI Director 10-year terms provide direct precedent for fixed-term executive branch positions -- and the Act's 6-year CS-1 terms are shorter. Federal Reserve Governor 14-year terms demonstrate even longer terms are constitutional. Military officer fixed terms show the model works for positions involving substantial executive authority. Morrison v. Olson establishes that restrictions not impeding presidential constitutional duties are permissible. Free Enterprise Fund reaffirms that single-layer for-cause removal is constitutional. The multi-member SPS structure avoids the single-director problem identified in Seila Law and Collins.

Second Line of Defense: Structural Distinction¶

Even if the Court continues narrowing removal-protection precedents, the Act's structural features distinguish it from the cases where protections have been struck:

The Act creates no single directors wielding concentrated power. SPS officers serve under the supervision of Cabinet Secretaries who serve at the President's pleasure. For-cause removal grounds are broad enough to enable removal for virtually any legitimate reason. The President's removal authority is constrained procedurally, not prohibited substantively. Terms are shorter than all existing challenged precedents. And the Act reduces political appointments to approximately 1,000 rather than eliminating them entirely -- preserving substantial presidential staffing authority.

Third Line of Defense: Structured Severability¶

If courts strike specific provisions, the structured severability architecture preserves core reforms. The constitutionally unexposed provisions -- transparency, documentation, merit selection, oversight, and the Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework -- continue operating regardless of how aggressively the Court interprets Article II removal authority. A worst-case scenario does not produce a worst-case outcome; it produces a reformed civil service operating on transparency and merit rather than on structural insulation from political removal.

Conclusion¶

The Act's constitutional design draws on decades of precedent establishing that Congress may structure executive branch employment, impose qualification requirements, establish fixed terms, and require for-cause removal procedures -- all while preserving presidential appointment power and removal authority for legitimate grounds.

Rev 1.3 strengthens this design in three ways. The tiered confirmation structure matches constitutional mechanisms to each tier's political significance, reducing constitutional exposure at lower tiers. The Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework operates through documentation and transparency -- constitutionally unexposed territory -- rather than through constraints on presidential authority. And the structured severability architecture ensures that the reform framework degrades gracefully under judicial challenge rather than collapsing entirely.

The analysis does not pretend that all provisions will necessarily survive an increasingly skeptical Supreme Court. It acknowledges which provisions are most vulnerable and explains how the Act's architecture preserves core reforms under any plausible judicial outcome. The Act's constitutionally unexposed provisions -- transparency, documentation, merit selection, professional qualification standards, revolving door restrictions, and congressional oversight -- are its load-bearing walls. Even under the most aggressive unitary executive ruling, a functioning reform framework built on these foundations remains fully operative.

Constitutional challenges are likely. The Act is designed to withstand them -- not by gambling on any single precedent holding, but by building a structure that preserves maximum reform benefit across the full range of plausible judicial outcomes.

Works Cited¶

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111. https://www.congress.gov/bill/95th-congress/senate-bill/2640

Classification Act of 1923. Ch. 265, 42 Stat. 1488.

Collins v. Yellen. 594 U.S. 220 (2021). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-422_k537.pdf

Edmond v. United States. 520 U.S. 651 (1997). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/boundvolumes/520bv.pdf

Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-861.pdf

Humphrey's Executor v. United States. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/295/602/

Morrison v. Olson. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/654/

Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act. Ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883). https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/pendleton-act

Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 591 U.S. 197 (2020). https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/19-7_n6io.pdf

U.S. Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 (Appointments Clause). https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/

12 U.S.C. Section 242 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors -- term of office). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/242

28 U.S.C. Section 532 (Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/532

31 U.S.C. Section 703 (Comptroller General -- authority and duties). https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/31/703

Revision History¶

Revision 1.3 (Current) - Updated to reflect CSAA Rev 1.3 legislative text - Reframed constitutional defense around Congress's Article I authority to structure executive departments - Added section on tiered confirmation and Appointments Clause analysis (CS-1 full Senate, CS-2 committee confirmation, CS-3 merit panel selection) - Added section on Professional Recommendation and Political Override Framework constitutional position - Expanded Supreme Court precedent analysis to engage directly with current Court trajectory (Seila Law v. CFPB, Collins v. Yellen) - Added honest vulnerability assessment of each provision's constitutional exposure - Replaced generic severability mention with full structured severability architecture section (tier-specific independence, explicit fallback provisions, constitutionally unexposed provisions) - Updated fixed-term precedent table to reflect revised term lengths (6/5 years versus original 10/8) - Updated CSAA constitutional design features for Rev 1.3 mechanisms - Revised "Responding to Constitutional Challenges" for three-level defense architecture - Updated publication date

Revision 1.1 - Extracted from CSAA Policy Rationale Rev 1.1 Part 5 - Consolidated constitutional and legal analysis into standalone reference document

📄 Download this document (opens on GitHub -- click the ⬇ download button)

Prepared by Albert Ramos for The American Policy Architecture Institute