Federal Elections Modernization Act¶

Constitutional Authority Technical Memorandum¶

Published February 2026¶

Based on Rev 5.0 of the Federal Elections Modernization Act

I. The Question Presented¶

Can Congress enact the Federal Elections Modernization Act's electoral provisions -- including STAR voting mandates, multi-member districts with proportional representation, unified general elections, Joint Endorsement Lists, and competency transparency requirements -- through ordinary legislation, or do such reforms require constitutional amendment? All subsequent references to the Federal Elections Modernization Act use "the Act."

Some scholars argue that mandating specific voting methods or fundamentally restructuring electoral systems represents such foundational change that only constitutional amendment can authorize it. They worry that statutory reform will face judicial invalidation by a Supreme Court skeptical of major structural changes enacted without supermajority consensus.

This memorandum presents the constitutional case for the Act's statutory approach. While acknowledging political and judicial uncertainties inherent in any major reform, we demonstrate that the Act rests on solid constitutional foundations, supported by clear textual authority, extensive historical precedent, and established Supreme Court doctrine.

The core argument is straightforward: Congress's authority to regulate the "manner of holding elections" necessarily includes the power to determine voting methods and how votes allocate representation. Choosing between plurality and proportional allocation formulas, and between various ballot tabulation methods, is a regulatory decision within Congressional authority, not a constitutional choice requiring amendment.

II. The Constitutional Text and Structure¶

A. The Elections Clause¶

Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides:

"The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations..."

This text grants Congress authority to regulate three aspects of federal elections: times, places, and manner. The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted "manner" broadly to encompass virtually all procedural and structural aspects of how elections are conducted.

B. What "Manner" Includes¶

The "manner of holding elections" necessarily encompasses:

Ballot access requirements: Who may compete for office
Voting methods: How voters express their preferences (plurality, ranked-choice, score-based, etc.)
Vote counting procedures: How ballots are tabulated and validated
Vote allocation formulas: How votes translate into winning candidates
District structure: Whether representatives are elected from single-member or multi-member districts
Election structure: Whether federal elections use primaries, unified general elections, or other formats
Ballot design and information: What information appears on ballots

The Act regulates all seven aspects. If "manner" doesn't include these elements, the word has no meaningful content. Congress cannot regulate election "manner" without addressing how votes determine winners -- that is the essence of electoral procedure.

C. The Breadth of Congressional Authority¶

The Elections Clause contains no limitations on Congressional authority beyond constitutional constraints found elsewhere (Equal Protection, Due Process, First Amendment, etc.). The text says Congress "may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations" -- language of plenary power, not circumscribed authority.

Crucially, the clause allows Congress to "alter" state regulations. This means Congress can override state choices about electoral structure, including choices about single-member versus multi-member districts, plurality versus proportional allocation, election structure and primary formats, voting method, and ballot format and information display.

The power to "alter" necessarily includes the power to fundamentally change.

III. Supreme Court Precedent¶

A. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton (1995)¶

The Supreme Court struck down state-imposed term limits on federal congressional candidates, holding that states cannot add qualifications beyond those specified in the Constitution. The Court emphasized that regulation of federal elections is a core Congressional power:

"The power granted to Congress to regulate the election of federal legislators is both comprehensive and preemptive... The Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant Congress 'the power to override state regulations' by establishing uniform national rules."

Relevance to the Act: If Congress has "comprehensive and preemptive" power over federal election regulation, this necessarily includes the power to establish voting methods, proportional representation, and ballot information requirements. The Court's language admits no carve-out for "fundamental" versus "procedural" electoral changes.

B. Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (2015)¶

The Court upheld Arizona's use of an independent commission for congressional redistricting, rejecting the argument that only state legislatures could regulate federal elections. The Court reaffirmed that "manner" includes structural choices:

"As to 'Manner,' we instruct that the word covers... a 'way,' 'method,' or 'system' of carrying something into effect... [It includes] matters like 'notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.'"

Relevance to the Act: If "manner" includes "way," "method," or "system" of conducting elections, it plainly includes the choice between plurality and proportional vote allocation systems, the specific tabulation method (STAR voting's score-then-runoff procedure), election structure (unified general elections versus partisan primaries), and ballot information requirements (party endorsements, FCAO scores).

These are different methods of translating votes into representation -- precisely the kind of structural choice the Elections Clause authorizes Congress to make.

C. Ex parte Yarbrough (1884)¶

The Court upheld federal criminal penalties for interfering with voting in federal elections, establishing that Congress has broad authority to protect federal election integrity:

"If this government is anything more than a mere aggregation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each of which is superior to the general government, it must have the power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and corruption."

Relevance to the Act: The principle that Congress can protect "elections on which its existence depends" supports Congressional authority to structure those elections in ways that ensure genuine representation. An electoral system that systematically wastes 40-60% of votes undermines the representative government the Constitution establishes.

D. Foster v. Love (1997)¶

The Court held that federal authority over timing and structure of federal elections is plenary, and that states cannot add requirements or structures that conflict with federal standards for federal elections.

Relevance to the Act: States cannot maintain conflicting election structures or voting methods for federal elections once Congress establishes national standards.

E. Oregon v. Mitchell (1970)¶

The Court upheld federal power to set voting age for federal elections, recognizing that federal standards can override state preferences in federal contests.

Relevance to the Act: Federal mandates for voting method (STAR), district structure (multi-member districts), and election structure (unified general elections) can override state preferences.

F. What These Cases Establish¶

Five principles emerge from Supreme Court precedent:

Congressional authority over federal elections is comprehensive and plenary
"Manner" includes structural and systemic electoral choices, not merely administrative details
Congress can override state electoral choices when exercising Elections Clause authority
Federal standards for federal elections preempt conflicting state procedures
The power extends to protecting electoral integrity and representative quality

Nothing in this precedent suggests that choosing proportional over plurality allocation, or STAR over plurality voting, exceeds Congressional authority. The Court has never held that any particular electoral structure or voting method is constitutionally mandated.

IV. Historical Precedent: Multi-Member Districts 1789-1967¶

A. Constitutional Practice¶

Multi-member congressional districts were widely used from 1789 to 1967 -- 178 years. During this period, twenty-six states used multi-member districts at some point, no court ever held multi-member districts unconstitutional, Congress itself used various allocation formulas without constitutional objection, and the practice was understood as entirely within state and Congressional regulatory authority.

If multi-member districts were unconstitutional or required constitutional amendment, this would have been discovered during 178 years of continuous use. The absence of any constitutional challenge during nearly two centuries of practice is powerful evidence that multi-member districts fall within ordinary regulatory authority.

B. The 1967 Statutory Ban¶

Congress banned multi-member districts in 1967 through the Uniform Congressional District Act (2 U.S.C. Section 2c), which requires states with multiple representatives to elect them "only from districts so established, no district to elect more than one Representative."

Critical point: This was ordinary legislation, not a constitutional amendment. Congress enacted it through simple majorities using Elections Clause authority.

The constitutional logic is inescapable: If Congress had authority to mandate single-member districts by statute in 1967, Congress has authority to repeal that mandate and restore multi-member districts by statute today. The power to mandate necessarily includes the power to un-mandate.

C. Why the 1967 Ban Was Enacted¶

The 1967 Act addressed a specific problem: plurality voting in multi-member districts enabled vote dilution and sweep effects. When a 51% majority could elect 100% of representatives from a multi-member district using plurality voting, minority communities (especially newly-enfranchised Black voters post-Voting Rights Act) could be systematically excluded from representation.

Congress's solution was to ban multi-member districts entirely -- a reasonable harm-reduction measure given available voting methods. But the problem was never multi-member districts themselves; it was plurality voting in multi-member districts.

The Act solves the underlying problem by pairing multi-member districts with proportional representation. This eliminates the vote dilution that motivated the 1967 ban while preserving the representational benefits of multi-member districts.

D. Supreme Court Validation of Multi-Member Districts¶

The Supreme Court has explicitly addressed multi-member districts under the Voting Rights Act:

Whitcomb v. Chavis (1971): The Court upheld multi-member districts against a constitutional challenge, finding no inherent Equal Protection violation in the district structure itself.

White v. Regester (1973): The Court struck down specific multi-member districts in Texas that were used to dilute minority voting power, but explicitly affirmed that multi-member districts are not per se unconstitutional. The problem was discriminatory application, not the structure itself.

Relevance to the Act: These cases validate the constitutional permissibility of multi-member districts while identifying the specific harm (vote dilution through plurality voting) that the Act addresses through proportional allocation.

V. Provision-Specific Constitutional Analysis¶

A. STAR Voting Method Mandate (Title IV, Section 404)¶

The Question: Can Congress mandate a specific voting method (STAR -- Score Then Automatic Runoff) for federal elections?

Constitutional Authority:

"Manner" includes vote counting procedures: Arizona State Legislature explicitly includes "counting of votes" within "manner of holding elections."
No constitutionally mandated voting method: The Constitution nowhere specifies plurality voting, ranked-choice voting, or any other method. Plurality voting is common law tradition, not constitutional requirement.
Historical flexibility: Congress and states have experimented with various voting methods throughout American history, including cumulative voting (Illinois, 1870-1980), approval voting (various localities), and ranked-choice voting (Maine, Alaska, various cities).
Administrative detail: The specific mathematical formula for tabulating votes (plurality, majority runoff, score-then-runoff, etc.) is quintessentially procedural -- exactly what "manner" encompasses.

Potential Objection: "Congress can regulate procedures but cannot mandate a specific voting technology or method."

Response: This distinction has no textual or precedential basis. If Congress can mandate that votes be counted (rather than estimated), that ballots be secret (rather than public), and that elections occur on specific dates (rather than state-chosen dates), Congress can mandate the tabulation method. STAR voting is a procedure for counting and determining winners -- core "manner" regulation.

B. Unified General Election Structure (Title IV, Section 404(d))¶

The Question: Can Congress eliminate state-administered primaries for federal offices and require all qualified candidates to appear directly on the general election ballot?

Constitutional Authority:

Election structure is "manner" regulation: How the overall election process is organized -- whether through primary-then-general, unified general, or other formats -- is part of the "manner of holding elections."
Precedent for federal election structure regulation: The Voting Rights Act regulates primary elections. Smith v. Allwright (1944) and Terry v. Adams (1953) established federal authority over primary processes for federal offices. If Congress can regulate primaries, Congress can eliminate them.
No constitutional right to state-administered primaries: The Constitution does not require primaries. Primary elections are a 20th-century innovation; the Founders' elections used no primaries. State-administered primaries for federal offices exist by state legislative choice, not constitutional mandate.
Distinction from California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000): Jones struck down California's blanket primary on First Amendment associational grounds. The Unified General Election Structure differs fundamentally because it does not conscript party processes into state machinery. Parties retain full internal autonomy -- caucuses, conventions, endorsement procedures -- conducted at their own expense. The Act separates party processes from state-administered elections rather than forcing parties to participate in state-run primaries.
Federal preemption is explicit: The Elections Clause grants Congress authority to "make or alter" state election regulations. Replacing state-administered primaries with a unified general election for federal offices falls squarely within this power.

Addressing First Amendment Concerns:

The Act's unified election structure preserves party associational rights completely. Parties may conduct internal nomination processes through caucuses, conventions, or party-controlled procedures. Parties may issue endorsements through Joint Endorsement Lists (Title II). Parties may campaign for, provide resources to, and recruit candidates. No party is required to participate in any state-administered election process.

The Act does not regulate party activity. It regulates the state-administered election -- the mechanism through which public resources are deployed to determine who holds public office. Separating that mechanism from party processes strengthens rather than burdens associational rights.

C. Multi-Member Districts with STAR-PR (Title IV, Sections 402-403)¶

Constitutional Authority: See Section IV above (historical precedent, 1967 Act repeal authority, Supreme Court validation).

Additional Considerations:

Voting Rights Act Compliance: The Act's proportional representation actually enhances VRA compliance by eliminating the vote dilution concern that motivated both the 1967 Act and the White v. Regester challenge. Under STAR-PR, minority communities achieving 15-20% support win proportional representation, no majority can sweep all seats through bloc voting, geographic concentration is no longer required for minority representation, and the mathematical structure prevents dilution regardless of district drawing.

Equal Protection: Multi-member districts with proportional allocation satisfy "one person, one vote" requirements. Each voter casts an equivalent ballot (same scoring range), each vote contributes proportionally to outcomes, district populations are substantially equal, and no voter's ballot has greater or lesser weight.

D. Joint Endorsement Lists (Title II)¶

The Question: Can Congress mandate ballot display of multiple party endorsements for single candidates?

Constitutional Authority:

Ballot format is "manner" regulation: What appears on ballots is quintessentially procedural.
Information provision, not restriction: Joint Endorsement Lists expand information available to voters without restricting ballot access or party rights.
No compelled speech concern: Parties choose whether to endorse; the requirement merely displays their voluntary endorsements.
Distinguishable from fusion voting challenges: Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997) addressed state authority to prohibit fusion (multiple party nominations with vote aggregation). The Act's Joint Endorsement Lists are different -- candidates appear once, not multiple times; no vote aggregation across party lines occurs; the system displays endorsements, not nominations; and the provision is a federal statute under Elections Clause authority, not a state law challenge.

Potential Objection: "Ballot format is traditionally state prerogative."

Response: Elections Clause authority explicitly allows Congress to "alter" state regulations. Ballot format for federal elections is federal "manner" regulation. States retain full authority over ballot format for state and local elections.

E. FCAO Non-Qualifying Structure (Title V)¶

The Question: Can Congress require competency examinations for federal candidates without violating U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton?

Constitutional Authority:

The Thornton analysis is straightforward: States (and by extension, Congress) cannot add qualifications for federal office beyond those specified in the Constitution (age, citizenship, residency). Any requirement that prevents candidates from running or serving based on additional criteria would violate this principle.

The Act's design avoids the Thornton problem:

Non-qualifying structure: FCAO examinations are explicitly non-qualifying. No minimum score is required. Candidates scoring 0% appear on ballots and may serve if elected.
Transparency mechanism, not qualification: FCAO provides information to voters, like nutritional labels on food. It does not gatekeep ballot access.
Elections Clause authority for disclosure: Congress routinely requires disclosure in federal elections (campaign finance, candidate statements, etc.). Competency scores are additional disclosed information.
Voters remain sole gatekeepers: The constitutional structure vests qualification decisions in voters, not agencies. FCAO preserves this -- voters see scores and decide.

Judicial Review Protections:

Title V includes extensive enforcement mechanisms to prevent any use of FCAO scores as qualifications: mandatory preliminary injunctions for any attempt to exclude low-scoring candidates, civil and criminal penalties for officials violating the non-qualifying principle, expedited judicial review with direct circuit court appeals, and standing for candidates, voters, and public interest organizations.

F. Federal Ballot Access Standards (Title I)¶

The Question: Can Congress establish uniform ballot access standards that preempt state requirements for federal elections?

Constitutional Authority:

Direct Elections Clause power: Ballot access requirements determine who may compete in elections -- plainly within "manner" regulation.
Established precedent: Federal courts routinely evaluate state ballot access requirements under constitutional standards. Congressional authority to set those standards directly is a fortiori.
Preemption is explicit: The Elections Clause grants the power to "alter" state regulations. Replacing fifty different state ballot access regimes with uniform federal standards is a textbook exercise of this authority.
State flexibility preserved: Title I establishes minimum federal standards while allowing states to provide easier access. States retain authority over state and local election ballot access.

G. Electoral Science Office Delegation (Title IV, Section 409)¶

The Question: Can Congress delegate authority to an independent agency to evaluate and propose modifications to voting method specifications, subject to Congressional review?

Constitutional Authority:

The Electoral Science Office (ESO) operates within a graduated protection architecture that raises distinct delegation doctrine questions for each tier.

Tier 1 -- Statutory Principles: The ESO has no authority over normative commitments (ballot interface consistency, universal scoring, equal treatment, proportional outcome requirement). These may be modified only by Act of Congress. No delegation concern arises because no delegation occurs.
Tier 2 -- Protected Design Elements: The ESO may study and propose modifications to core design choices (0-5 star scoring range, unscored candidate treatment, single-winner STAR structure), but changes require affirmative Congressional approval via joint resolution. This is not delegation of legislative power -- it is a structured recommendation process. Congress retains full decisional authority. The BRAC commission model provides direct precedent: expert bodies propose, Congress disposes through an up-or-down vote.
Tier 3 -- Adjustable Technical Parameters: The ESO may modify implementation details (quota formulas, reweighting methodology, tie-breaking procedures) subject to Congressional disapproval via joint resolution. This follows the Congressional Review Act model, in which Congress delegates rulemaking authority but retains a veto. The Supreme Court has upheld Congressional delegation of technical standard-setting to expert agencies when bounded by an intelligible principle. The Act provides extensive boundary conditions (Section 409(e)(2)) requiring that any modification preserve or improve proportionality, maintain or reduce computational complexity, preserve transparency, and not create strategic manipulation opportunities. These boundary conditions constitute an intelligible principle far more specific than those upheld in cases like Mistretta v. United States (1989) and Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (2001).

Major Questions Doctrine Considerations: The ESO's Tier 3 authority might face scrutiny under West Virginia v. EPA (2022), which requires clear Congressional authorization for agency decisions of major political and economic significance. However, the ESO's authority is distinguishable on multiple grounds. First, Congress explicitly created the ESO for this specific purpose with detailed statutory parameters -- unlike the EPA invoking broad statutory language for novel authority. Second, the modifications are technical, not policy-changing: adjusting a quota formula or tie-breaking procedure within boundary conditions that preserve proportionality is not a "major question" comparable to restructuring an industry. Third, Congressional review is built into every tier, with disapproval authority for Tier 3 and affirmative approval required for Tier 2. Fourth, the graduated protection architecture itself demonstrates clear Congressional intent to delegate precisely this scope of authority -- the statute's specificity is evidence of deliberate authorization, not the kind of ambiguous grant the Major Questions Doctrine targets.

VI. The Vote Allocation Framework¶

A. The Core Constitutional Question¶

The constitutional question is not about "proportional representation" as an abstract concept. It is about vote allocation authority: Who decides the mathematical formula by which votes translate into representation?

Under the current system, the district formula is one district equals one seat, the allocation rule is plurality winner takes the seat, the result is 40-60% of votes in each district are systematically wasted, and the authority is statutory (2 U.S.C. Section 2c) plus common law tradition.

Under the Act, the district formula is 3-7 seats per district (with single/two-seat exceptions), the allocation rule is STAR-PR determining proportional seat distribution, the result is 80-90% of votes translating into representation, and the authority is Congressional statute under the Elections Clause.

Both systems make choices about vote allocation. Neither is constitutionally mandated. The question is simply which formula Congress chooses to adopt in exercising its Elections Clause authority.

B. Enfranchisement Versus Voting Theater¶

The Constitution guarantees more than the formal right to cast a ballot. Meaningful enfranchisement requires that votes translate into representation. A voter who casts a ballot for the third-place candidate in a safe R+20 district has performed the civic ritual of voting but received none of the substance of representation.

This is voting theater, not enfranchisement.

The Act actualizes the enfranchisement that plurality voting only pretends to provide. The constitutional right is not merely "the right to cast a counted ballot" -- it is the right to meaningful participation in choosing representatives.

C. Comparative Representation Analysis¶

Consider five congressional seats covering the same population:

Five single-member districts under plurality: Minimum vote share to control all 5 seats is approximately 25% (if perfectly efficient). Typical result: 55-65% of voters control all 5 seats (due to geography/gerrymandering). 35-45% of voters receive zero representation. Geographic minorities in each district are systematically excluded.

One five-seat district under STAR-PR: Minimum vote share to win 1 seat is approximately 16.7% (with typical ballot patterns). Typical result: each substantial bloc (greater than 15-20%) wins representation. 80-85% of voters receive actual representation. All significant political communities achieve voice proportional to size.

Which system better fulfills the constitutional promise of representative government? Which better satisfies Equal Protection principles of "one person, one vote"?

VII. Responding to Constitutional Objections¶

A. "The Constitution Implicitly Requires Single-Member Districts"¶

Objection: The Founders understood representation through single-member districts; this structure is implicit in constitutional design even if not explicit in text.

Response: Historical practice contradicts this -- multi-member districts were extensively used from 1789-1967 without constitutional objection. The Founders used multi-member districts themselves; early Congresses seated representatives elected from multi-member districts. Constitutional silence is meaningful -- if single-member districts were required, the Constitution would have said so (as it does for other electoral requirements like age, citizenship, and residency). The 1967 ban was statutory -- if single-member districts were constitutionally required, no statute would have been needed to mandate them.

B. "Proportional Representation Is Foreign to American Tradition"¶

Objection: Proportional representation is a European import alien to American democratic traditions; adopting it requires constitutional amendment to fundamentally alter our system.

Response: Proportional methods have American precedent -- Illinois used cumulative voting (a semi-proportional system) from 1870-1980 (110 years), and reformers from both parties called for its reinstatement. STAR voting is intuitively American -- the 0-5 star rating interface is already familiar to every American from consumer ratings, and STAR-PR extends this familiar mechanism to proportional allocation. The Constitution doesn't mandate any particular voting method; plurality voting is common-law tradition, not constitutional requirement. Electoral science has advanced -- in 1789, proportional representation hadn't been invented, and freezing electoral methods at 18th-century technology is no more sensible than freezing any other domain.

C. "This Violates 'One Person, One Vote'"¶

Objection: Reynolds v. Sims (1964) and related cases require equal representation. Proportional systems might give different "effective" representation to different voters, violating equal protection.

Response: Equal population requirements are satisfied -- the Act requires multi-member districts to contain substantially equal population (Section 402(b)(2)), satisfying Reynolds. Proportional systems enhance equality by ensuring every substantial bloc receives representation proportional to size -- closer to true equality than plurality systems where 40-60% receive zero representation. International precedent supports this -- proportional representation is used successfully in democracies with strong equality principles (Germany, New Zealand, Ireland, etc.). The real equal protection violation is the current system that systematically nullifies millions of votes based on where voters live.

D. "The Elections Clause Only Covers Procedure, Not Structure"¶

Objection: Congress can regulate election procedures (ballot access, voting times, counting methods) but cannot fundamentally restructure the electoral system from plurality to proportional representation.

Response: No textual basis exists for this distinction -- "manner" means "way" or "method," and it includes structural choices about how elections operate. Supreme Court precedent contradicts this -- Arizona State Legislature explicitly defined "manner" to include electoral "systems." The procedure/structure distinction is incoherent because vote allocation formulas are procedural -- they specify how votes are counted and winners determined. Congress has made "structural" changes by statute before -- expanding the House, changing apportionment formulas, mandating single-member districts, establishing ballot access standards -- all were enacted by statute.

E. "This Exceeds Congressional Authority Under the Major Questions Doctrine"¶

Objection: Under West Virginia v. EPA (2022), major policy decisions of economic and political significance cannot be based on ambiguous statutory authority. Proportional representation is a major question requiring clear authorization.

Response: The Elections Clause provides clear authorization -- unlike the Clean Air Act provisions at issue in West Virginia v. EPA, the Elections Clause explicitly grants Congress authority to regulate election "manner." No ambiguity exists -- "manner of holding elections" clearly includes vote allocation methods and voting procedures. The Major Questions Doctrine applies to agency action -- it limits administrative agency authority to make major policy without clear Congressional authorization, and here Congress itself is acting. Historical practice confirms this -- the 1967 Act made an equally "major" structural change (banning multi-member districts) by statute without constitutional objection.

F. "STAR Voting Is Untested and Congress Cannot Mandate Experimental Systems"¶

Objection: STAR voting has limited track record; Congress cannot mandate an experimental voting method nationwide.

Response: No constitutional "proven track record" requirement exists -- the Constitution does not require that voting methods be extensively tested before Congress may authorize them. STAR components are well-established -- score voting and automatic runoffs are both proven methods, and STAR combines them. Phased implementation addresses concerns -- the Act implements STAR voting with assessment checkpoints, allowing course correction. The current system is the experiment -- plurality voting systematically fails to translate votes into representation, and continuing it is not the "safe" choice.

G. The Party Lists Distinction: Where Constitutional Authority Ends¶

The preceding arguments demonstrate that the Act's candidate-centered proportional representation falls within Congressional authority under the Elections Clause. However, acknowledging the limits of that authority strengthens rather than weakens the constitutional case. Not all forms of proportional representation are constitutionally equivalent.

Why Party List Systems Would Likely Require Amendment:

Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) systems, used successfully in Germany and New Zealand, achieve proportional representation partly through party lists: voters cast a ballot for a political party, and the party fills allocated seats from a pre-determined list of candidates.

The Article I, Section 2 Problem:

The Constitution specifies that "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States..." This language strongly implies direct choice of individual representatives by voters.

Under party list systems, voters choose parties, not individual representatives. Party leadership determines which specific individuals fill allocated seats through list ordering. This raises a fundamental question: When voters cast ballots for "Democratic Party" and that party's list determines that John Smith (ranked #4 on the list) gets a seat, was Smith truly "chosen by the People"?

How the Act's Candidate-Centered Approach Preserves Direct Choice:

STAR-PR maintains the fundamental constitutional structure of voter-representative relationships. Voters see individual named candidates and rate each one 0-5 stars. Representatives win seats because voters rated them highly -- not because party leadership placed them strategically on a list. If a representative breaks with their party, they can still run and win based on personal voter support. The direct accountability relationship is preserved exactly as the Constitution contemplates.

The Constitutional Line:

Congress can regulate vote-counting procedures and allocation formulas, district structure (single-member vs. multi-member), voting methods (plurality, ranked-choice, score-based, etc.), and how votes for individual candidates translate into representation.

Congress cannot fundamentally alter who does the choosing (voters must choose representatives, not parties), the direct representative-constituent relationship, or the constitutional requirement that representatives be "chosen by the People."

The Act stays firmly on the constitutional side of this line.

VIII. The Electoral Science Argument¶

A. Voting Methods as Technology¶

The Founders used the best available electoral technology of their era: plurality voting in single-member or multi-member districts. This was sophisticated for 1789, utilizing the mathematical and administrative tools they possessed.

We don't limit ourselves to 18th-century technology in any other domain. Engineering doesn't restrict bridges to founding-era materials. Medicine doesn't limit surgery to 18th-century techniques. Communications don't restrict speech to parchment and horseback. Why freeze vote-counting methods in 1789?

Electoral system design is a science. Over 200+ years we have accumulated empirical evidence from diverse democracies worldwide, mathematical proofs about voting system properties and pathologies, natural experiments from countries that switched systems, and rigorous social science research on representation quality.

B. What Electoral Science Shows¶

Modern electoral science demonstrates that plurality voting has systematic pathologies (spoiler effects, vote splitting, strategic voting incentives, minority vote dilution); proportional systems produce superior outcomes (better demographic representation, reduced polarization, higher voter satisfaction, more accountable governance); the voting method matters more than district structure (multi-member districts with plurality voting dilute minority votes, while multi-member districts with proportional voting enhance representation); and STAR voting specifically has desirable properties (monotonicity, resistance to strategic manipulation, expressiveness, auditability, intuitive interface).

Constitutional interpretation should not require ignorance of electoral science. When we know empirically that proportional systems produce more representative outcomes, the Constitution's commitment to representative government supports rather than forbids their adoption.

C. The Constitution as Enabling Framework¶

The Founders created a framework for republican government, not a frozen set of specific mechanisms. Article I establishes a House of Representatives elected by the people. The Constitution specifies how many representatives each state gets (apportionment by population), minimum qualifications for representatives (age, citizenship, residency), and who may vote (extended by subsequent amendments).

The Constitution does not specify district structure (single-member vs. multi-member), voting method (plurality, majority, proportional, etc.), vote counting procedures, ballot format or design, or election structure.

These are matters for Congressional regulation under the Elections Clause -- precisely what the Act provides.

IX. Why the Amendment Route Is Unnecessary¶

A. The Amendment Standard Is Extremely High¶

Constitutional amendment requires two-thirds vote in both chambers of Congress (67 Senators, 290 Representatives), ratification by three-fourths of state legislatures (38 states), and typically decades of organizing and political mobilization.

Only 27 amendments have been ratified in 235+ years. The last significant structural amendment (26th Amendment, lowering voting age) passed over 50 years ago. The Equal Rights Amendment, proposed in 1972 with massive support, still hasn't been ratified.

Why require this nearly-impossible standard when existing constitutional authority clearly supports statutory reform?

B. The Statutory Route Preserves Democratic Responsiveness¶

If the Act's electoral provisions prove successful and popular, they continue. If they produce unexpected problems, Congress can modify or repeal them. Constitutional amendments are essentially permanent -- they require another amendment to change.

Electoral systems should be amendable based on evidence and experience. The statutory route preserves democratic accountability and institutional learning.

C. Even If Challenged, Statutory Reform Advances the Cause¶

If the Act passes and faces judicial challenge, several outcomes are possible: courts uphold it (most likely, given strong constitutional foundations); courts strike it down, clarifying what amendment is needed (valuable information); or courts strike parts but sever others (partial victory, momentum for full reform).

Even in the worst case (total invalidation), the statutory attempt will have demonstrated serious Congressional support for electoral reform, educated the public about electoral system alternatives, forced courts to articulate why better representation methods are forbidden, and created political momentum for constitutional amendment if truly necessary.

But requiring amendment first guarantees failure. No constitutional amendment for proportional representation will pass without first demonstrating need and building political support -- which requires attempting statutory reform.

X. Strategic Considerations for Judicial Review¶

A. The Current Judicial Climate¶

Concerns about conservative judicial skepticism toward major statutory reforms are legitimate. The current Supreme Court has shown preference for textualist/originalist interpretation, skepticism of "major questions" decided by agencies or implied in statutes, and deference to state sovereignty in some contexts.

However, the Elections Clause is explicit, not implied -- unlike agency authority based on statutory interpretation, Congressional authority over federal elections is constitutionally explicit. Originalist interpretation supports the Act -- multi-member districts were original practice, and the 1967 ban was modern innovation. Textualism supports the Act -- "manner of holding elections" plainly includes vote allocation methods. The Court has consistently recognized broad Congressional authority -- Thornton and Arizona State Legislature were decided by Courts with conservative members.

B. Building the Constitutional Record¶

The Act's careful construction helps it survive judicial review through explicit constitutional findings (Section 2(a)) establishing Congressional awareness of authority and precedent, severability provisions (multiple titles) ensuring maximum preservation if any part is invalidated, phased implementation (~14-year timeline) demonstrating Congress is not imposing radical change overnight, evidence-based design incorporating best practices from electoral science and international experience, and historical grounding restoring American historical practices rather than importing foreign models.

C. The Fallback Position¶

The Act includes critical fallbacks. If multi-member districts are challenged, STAR voting in single-member districts still produces major improvements. If specific provisions are struck, severability ensures other reforms continue.

The reform doesn't fail completely if any single provision faces obstacles.

D. Framing for Judicial Review¶

If the Act faces constitutional challenge, the distinction between candidate-centered and party-list proportional representation helps frame the debate favorably:

Plaintiff's Likely Argument: "Any form of proportional representation requires constitutional amendment because it fundamentally changes how Congress is elected."

The Act's Response: "Not all proportional systems are constitutionally equivalent. Party list systems might require amendment (we acknowledge this possibility), but candidate-centered proportional representation has clear statutory authorization. The question isn't whether 'proportional representation' generally is constitutional -- it's whether Congress can improve vote-counting methods for candidate elections. The answer is clearly yes."

By conceding the stronger case (party lists likely need amendment), the Act makes its case (candidate-centered PR is statutory) more credible.

XI. Conclusion¶

A. The Constitutional Case Is Strong¶

The Act rests on solid constitutional foundations:

Clear textual authority: The Elections Clause grants Congress power to regulate election "manner," which necessarily includes voting methods and vote allocation formulas
Established precedent: Supreme Court cases recognize comprehensive Congressional authority over federal elections
Historical practice: Multi-member districts were used for 178 years without constitutional objection
Statutory precedent: The 1967 ban on multi-member districts was enacted by statute, proving such changes don't require amendment
Electoral science support: Modern understanding of electoral systems shows proportional methods better achieve constitutional goals
Candidate-centered design: The Act maintains direct voter choice of individual representatives, satisfying Article I requirements

B. Amendment Is Unnecessary and Counterproductive¶

Requiring constitutional amendment before attempting statutory reform would set an impossibly high bar for any electoral system improvement, ignore clear Elections Clause authority explicitly granted in constitutional text, contradict 200+ years of Congressional practice regulating elections by statute, guarantee decades of delay before any reform is even attempted, and prevent democratic learning and iterative improvement based on evidence.

C. The Right Strategy¶

The correct approach is to pass the Act through ordinary legislation exercising clear Elections Clause authority, defend it vigorously if challenged presenting strong constitutional arguments, demonstrate its benefits through implementation building public and political support, and pursue constitutional amendment only if absolutely necessary having first established the case through statutory attempt.

Even constitutional skeptics should support this approach: If amendment truly is required, the statutory route will clarify exactly what amendment language is needed and build the political coalition to pass it.

But most likely, amendment will prove unnecessary. The Constitution already grants Congress the authority the Act exercises. The question is not whether Congress has the power, but whether Congress has the wisdom and courage to use it.

D. Representative Government Requires Representative Elections¶

The Constitution establishes a government of, by, and for the people. Representative government cannot function properly when electoral systems systematically waste 40-60% of votes, entrench two-party duopoly, enable partisan gerrymandering, and produce counter-majoritarian outcomes.

The Constitution does not mandate these pathologies. It grants Congress broad authority to regulate federal elections precisely so that electoral systems can evolve to better serve representative democracy.

The Act exercises that authority to ensure every vote counts and representation reflects voter preferences. This is not a radical departure from constitutional principles -- it is the fulfillment of them.

The Founders gave us representative government. The Act gives us representative elections worthy of that government.

Appendix A: Key Case Citations¶

Elections Clause Authority:

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787 (2015)
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884)
Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67 (1997)
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)

Multi-Member District Precedent:

Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)

Equal Protection / One Person One Vote:

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964)

Party Association Rights:

California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)

Primary Election / Election Structure Authority:

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)

Major Questions Doctrine:

West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022)

Delegation Doctrine:

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001)

Appendix B: Provisions Analyzed¶

Provision	Title/Section	Constitutional Basis
STAR Voting Mandate	Title IV, Section 404	Elections Clause ("manner")
Unified General Elections	Title IV, Section 404(d)	Elections Clause + preemption authority
Multi-Member Districts	Title IV, Section 402	Historical practice + 1967 Act repeal authority
STAR-PR Allocation	Title IV, Section 404(g)	Elections Clause ("manner")
Electoral Science Office	Title IV, Section 409	Elections Clause + delegation doctrine
Joint Endorsement Lists	Title II	Elections Clause (ballot format)
FCAO Examinations	Title V	Elections Clause (disclosure) + non-qualifying structure
Federal Ballot Access	Title I	Elections Clause ("manner")
Redistricting Standards	Title IV, Section 403	Elections Clause + VRA authority

Revision History¶

Revision 3.0 (Current) - Aligned document structure with APAI Document Production Standards Rev 1.4 - Relocated Revision History from header to footer per Section 1.3 - Removed non-standard header metadata (Prepared by block, Document Status line) - Removed non-standard END OF DOCUMENT footer marker - No substantive content changes

Revision 2.0 - Updated all references for Federal Elections Modernization Act (FEMA) Rev 5.0 branding. - Reframed nonpartisan primary analysis as Unified General Election Structure (UGES) analysis reflecting Rev 4.2+ architecture. - Added Section V.G: Electoral Science Office delegation doctrine analysis covering graduated protection architecture. - Corrected Section X.B implementation timeline reference (was 25-year, corrected to ~14-year per Rev 4.0+ architecture). - Removed stale approval voting contingency reference not present in current legislative text. - Corrected all section number cross-references to align with FEMA Rev 5.0 statutory text. - Fixed encoding artifacts throughout.

Revision 1.0 - Initial version adapted from RCEA Constitutional Authority document. - Updated all references to reflect CMA branding and current provisions. - Expanded analysis of STAR voting method mandates (Title IV). - Added section on nonpartisan primary authority. - Added section on Joint Endorsement Lists authority (Title II). - Added section on FCAO non-qualifying structure (Title V). - Integrated analysis of 1967 Uniform Congressional District Act repeal authority. - Added Voting Rights Act considerations for multi-member districts. - Expanded judicial review strategy section.

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Prepared by Albert Ramos for The American Policy Architecture Institute