Secure Our Children Act¶

Policy Rationale¶

Published February 2026¶

Based on Rev 2.5 of the Secure Our Children Act

Design Philosophy¶

The Secure Our Children Act (SOCA), hereafter referred to as "the Act," rests on four foundational principles that distinguish it from previous child benefit expansions: the child-centered benefit, universality of contribution, adequacy of benefit, and durability of structure.

The Child-Centered Benefit¶

The Act begins from a simple premise: the credit is for the child, not the parent. Children do not choose their parents. They do not choose their family's income level, employment status, or economic circumstances. A child born to billionaires did not earn that fortune; a child born into poverty did not cause that condition. Support for children should recognize this fundamental reality.

This principle has a concrete policy implication: the Act provides the same benefit amount for every qualifying child regardless of parental income. There is no phase-out based on household earnings. Every child from birth through age 17 receives identical support: $3,600 annually for children under 6, $3,000 for children 6-17, plus the $2,000 Birth Support Payment.

Progressivity -- the principle that those with greater means should contribute more -- is handled entirely through the Child Security Contribution's rate structure. High-earning families are substantial net contributors to the program even while their children receive the same benefit as every other child. This design achieves progressivity without conditioning child support on parental circumstances.

Universality of Contribution¶

The Act establishes that supporting the next generation is a shared national responsibility. Every American who earns income contributes to the Child Security Contribution -- not because children are a "burden" to be distributed, but because a society that invests in its children reaps collective returns in economic productivity, social stability, and democratic vitality. The contribution is universal but progressive: everyone participates, but those with greater means contribute proportionally more through the income-based kicker.

This represents a philosophical departure from general-revenue funding, which treats child benefits as discretionary spending competing with defense, infrastructure, and every other government priority. Instead, the Child Security Contribution creates a dedicated social compact: Americans contribute to child security throughout their working lives, and children receive support regardless of whether their parents happened to have earned income in any particular year.

Adequacy of Benefit¶

A child benefit that lifts children from deep poverty into less-deep poverty fails as policy and fails as politics. The Act's benefit levels -- $3,600 for children under 6 and $3,000 for children 6-17 -- were calibrated to meaningfully improve family economic security, not merely to check a box. Combined with the $2,000 Birth Support Payment, the Act provides support scaled to actual family costs during the most resource-intensive and economically vulnerable periods of child-rearing.

The age-differentiated structure reflects the research consensus that early childhood represents both the highest cost period (requiring intensive care, often with a parent reducing work) and the highest-return period for developmental investment. The Birth Support Payment addresses the acute income shock surrounding childbirth, when household earnings decline precisely as expenses increase.

Durability of Structure¶

The 2021 expanded child tax credit demonstrated what ambitious child policy could achieve -- and what happens when it expires. The one-year expansion reduced child poverty to historic lows; its expiration reversed those gains almost immediately. The Act is designed from the outset for permanence.

The no-sunset provision is necessary but not sufficient. Permanence requires fiscal durability (dedicated funding that doesn't compete in annual appropriations battles), political durability (broad-based contribution creating stakeholder investment), and administrative durability (systems built for ongoing operation rather than emergency improvisation). The Child Security Contribution and automatic rate adjustment mechanism together create a self-sustaining structure that can weather political and economic cycles.

Problem Analysis¶

The Persistence of Child Poverty¶

The United States tolerates higher child poverty rates than virtually any peer nation. Before the 2021 expansion, approximately 10 million children lived in poverty, with over 3 million in deep poverty. The temporary expansion demonstrated these outcomes are not inevitable -- child poverty dropped by nearly half during the brief period of enhanced benefits. The policy choice to let the expansion expire was also a choice to accept the poverty rates that followed.

The pre-2021 child tax credit structure embodied a contradiction: it offered the least support to children in the poorest families. The earned income requirement meant families with little or no wage income -- including those with unemployed parents, parents caring for family members, parents with disabilities, and parents in deep poverty -- received reduced or zero benefits. The children most in need received the least help.

The Birth Income Shock¶

The period surrounding childbirth represents a distinct economic crisis for American families. Research documents average household income declines exceeding 10 percent during the birth month, with single mothers experiencing earnings drops of approximately 31 percent in surrounding months. This decline occurs precisely when expenses increase: medical costs, childcare needs, housing adjustments, and the thousand other costs of welcoming a new child.

Other developed nations address this shock through paid family leave, birth grants, or both. The United States lacks comprehensive paid leave and provides no birth-specific cash support. Families navigate the income-expense squeeze through savings drawdown (if available), debt accumulation, or going without. The stress falls hardest on lower-income families with fewer resources to buffer the shock.

The Fiscal Vulnerability of Child Policy¶

Child benefits funded from general revenue face relentless political pressure. Every budget cycle, child programs compete against politically powerful interests for limited discretionary resources. The result is chronic underfunding, arbitrary expirations, and policy instability that undermines program effectiveness and family planning.

The 2021 experience is instructive. Despite demonstrated poverty-reduction impact, the enhanced credit was not extended because competing budget priorities and deficit concerns prevailed. Children -- who do not vote, do not lobby, and do not make campaign contributions -- lost. A funding mechanism that removes child benefits from annual budget politics is essential to durability.

Alternatives Considered¶

Retained Earnings Requirement¶

One alternative would maintain some earned income requirement while reducing its harshness -- for example, a lower phase-in rate or higher minimum benefit. This approach has political appeal: it preserves the link between "work" and benefits that some find morally important.

The Act rejects this approach because:

It perpetuates exclusion of the poorest children. Any earnings requirement, however structured, provides less support to children in families without wage income. These children are not less deserving; their parents may be caregivers, disabled, unemployed, or in circumstances that prevent traditional employment.
It imposes administrative burden with minimal anti-abuse value. Verifying earned income requires complex systems and creates compliance burdens that fall hardest on families with non-traditional income patterns. The fraud prevented does not justify the access barriers created.
It conflicts with the support rationale. If child benefits exist because children need support, conditioning that support on parental earnings contradicts the policy's purpose. Children do not choose their parents' employment status.

General Revenue Funding¶

The pre-existing child tax credit was funded from general revenue, as was the 2021 expansion. This approach avoids creating a new contribution and can be presented as "free" benefits.

The Act rejects general revenue funding because:

It dooms the benefit to instability. Every year, child benefits must be defended against competing priorities. The 2021 expiration demonstrates the outcome.
It fails to create stakeholder investment. When benefits flow from an undifferentiated general fund, no one feels a specific connection to the program's success. The Child Security Contribution creates a tangible link: Americans can see their contribution and understand they are investing in the next generation.
It lacks transparency. General revenue funding obscures the cost-benefit relationship. Dedicated funding forces honest accounting of what child security costs and what it delivers.

Existing Program Expansion (EITC/TANF/SNAP)¶

Rather than creating new credit structures, an alternative would expand existing means-tested programs like the Earned Income Tax Credit, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program.

The Act takes a different approach because:

Existing programs have significant coverage gaps. EITC requires earned income. TANF has work requirements, time limits, and extremely low benefits in most states. SNAP is limited to food purchases. No existing program provides universal, adequate, unrestricted cash support to families with children.
Means-tested programs create poverty traps. The phase-out structures of multiple overlapping programs can create effective marginal tax rates exceeding 50 percent for low-income families attempting to increase earnings. The Act's universal benefit avoids adding another cliff to the marginal rate stack.
Administrative complexity undermines access. Families navigating TANF, SNAP, Medicaid, and tax credits face multiple agencies, different eligibility rules, and incompatible reporting requirements. The Act provides a single, simple benefit administered through familiar tax infrastructure.

Income-Based Phase-Out¶

An earlier version of the Act included income-based phase-out thresholds, reducing benefits for families above certain income levels. This design choice is common in American tax policy and has political appeal: it "targets" benefits to those who "need" them.

Rev 2.4 eliminates the phase-out because:

The credit is for the child, not the parent. Children do not choose their parents' income level. A newborn to wealthy parents did not earn that fortune any more than a newborn to poor parents caused that poverty.
Progressivity is achieved through the contribution side. The Child Security Contribution's rate structure ensures high earners are substantial net contributors to the program. A household earning $1,000,000 contributes $15,000-$60,000 (depending on filing status) while receiving $6,000 for two children. Progressivity is built into the revenue mechanism; the benefit side can be simple.
Phase-outs create marriage penalties and administrative complexity. Different thresholds for different filing statuses create situations where marital status affects child support -- a policy outcome with no principled justification.
Universal child benefits have proven political durability. The United Kingdom's Child Benefit, Canada's Child Benefit, and other international models demonstrate that benefits touching all families build broader political coalitions than means-tested programs.
The "Jeff Bezos's child gets a check" objection is handled by contribution design. The political problem with benefits to billionaires is the perception of unfairness. When that billionaire contributes hundreds of thousands of dollars to the program while receiving a few thousand, the net outcome is clearly progressive.

State-Level Approach¶

Some argue child benefits should be a state responsibility, with federal withdrawal from the field or block grants replacing direct benefits.

The Act rejects state-level approaches because:

Child poverty is a national problem requiring national response. Children in Mississippi deserve no less support than children in Massachusetts. A patchwork of state programs would perpetuate geographic inequality in child welfare.
States lack adequate revenue capacity. Federal revenue sources (income tax, payroll tax) are more progressive and stable than state revenue sources (sales tax, property tax). Pushing child benefits to states would either reduce funding adequacy or force regressive state tax increases.
Labor mobility requires portable benefits. Families move across state lines for employment, family, and opportunity. State-based benefits create barriers to mobility and administrative complexity for families navigating interstate moves.

Provision-by-Provision Rationale¶

Credit Amount and Age Structure¶

The $3,600/$3,000 amounts for young children versus older children reflect cost and developmental research. Child care costs are highest for children under 6, when parents face the work/care tradeoff most acutely. Developmental returns to investment are also highest in early childhood. The approximately 20 percent higher benefit for young children recognizes these realities without completely ignoring the ongoing costs of older children.

These amounts were also calibrated to provide meaningful poverty-reduction impact. At $300 per month ($3,600/year), a family with one young child receives support equivalent to approximately 15 percent of the federal poverty line -- substantial enough to affect material circumstances, not merely symbolic.

Full Refundability Without Earnings Requirement¶

This is one of the Act's most important structural features from prior law. By making the credit fully refundable without regard to earned income, the Act ensures every child receives support regardless of parental employment status.

The objection that this "subsidizes non-work" misunderstands both the policy and its recipients. Many zero-earner families include caregivers (often caring for elderly or disabled family members), people with disabilities, people between jobs, and people in deep poverty who face barriers to employment. Their children are not served by exclusion.

More fundamentally, the benefit goes to children, not parents. Conditioning child support on parental behavior punishes children for circumstances beyond their control. The Act treats children as worthy of support in their own right.

Universal Benefit Without Phase-Out¶

The Act provides the full credit amount to every qualifying child regardless of parental income. This represents a deliberate design choice to locate progressivity in the contribution mechanism rather than the benefit structure.

The result is elegant simplicity: every child under 6 receives $3,600; every child 6-17 receives $3,000. No calculations, no cliffs, no marriage penalty considerations. High-income families are net contributors to the program through the Child Security Contribution; they receive the same benefit for their children because children's worthiness of support does not depend on their parents' earnings.

This design aligns the Act with successful international models. Canada's Canada Child Benefit and the United Kingdom's Child Benefit (before recent modifications) provided universal support to all children, with progressivity achieved through the tax system. These programs demonstrate that universal child benefits build durable political support across income levels.

Monthly Advance Payments¶

Lump-sum tax refunds, while administratively simpler, fail to match the rhythm of family expenses. Rent is due monthly. Groceries are purchased weekly. Child care providers expect regular payment. A $3,600 annual refund received in February does little to help with June's bills.

The 2021 experience demonstrated monthly payments are feasible and that families value them. Monthly payment also reduces the "refund as windfall" psychology that can lead to non-essential spending. Regular, predictable income allows family budgeting and reduces reliance on high-cost credit to bridge cash flow gaps.

Safe Harbor for Overpayments¶

The safe harbor addresses a genuine problem: advance payments based on prior-year information may exceed actual entitlement when circumstances change mid-year. Without protection, families could face unexpected tax bills that claw back support they already spent on children.

The $2,000 per child waiver for good-faith recipients prevents punishing families for changed circumstances while maintaining incentives for accurate reporting. Income-based installment agreements for amounts exceeding the safe harbor ensure recovery does not create hardship.

Birth Support Payment¶

The $2,000 Birth Support Payment addresses a gap no existing program fills: the acute income shock surrounding childbirth. Unlike the ongoing child tax credit, which addresses continuing costs of child-rearing, the Birth Support Payment targets a specific moment of financial vulnerability.

The advance payment option (up to 60 days before due date at 20 weeks gestation) allows families to prepare for the birth rather than scrambling to catch up afterward. The automatic payment pathway (when systems permit) ensures families receive support without navigating bureaucratic applications during an already stressful period.

The stillbirth and infant loss provisions reflect both policy and compassion. Families experiencing pregnancy loss face medical expenses and often lost work time. Requiring recapture of advance payments -- or denying payment entirely -- would add financial injury to emotional trauma. The "minimally necessary documentation" standard prevents intrusive verification requirements during grief.

Child Security Contribution Structure¶

The 1.50% base rate on all AGI plus 3.00% kicker above $500,000 ($1,000,000 joint) balances several objectives:

Universal participation: Everyone with income contributes, creating broad-based stakeholder investment in child security.
Progressivity: Higher earners contribute proportionally more through the kicker rate.
Revenue adequacy: Combined rates were calibrated to fund universal benefits with surplus for reserves and economic fluctuation. Based on cost modeling, these rates generate approximately $270 billion annually against program costs of approximately $257 billion, providing full funding plus approximately 5% surplus for the Family Security Stabilization Account.
Administrative simplicity: Collection through income tax return leverages existing infrastructure.

The threshold for the kicker ($500,000/$1,000,000) ensures the additional rate affects only high earners while avoiding complexity of multiple graduated brackets.

Automatic Rate Adjustment Mechanism¶

The automatic adjustment mechanism reflects a core design insight: programs that require routine Congressional action for basic maintenance become hostage to unrelated political dynamics. Social Security's COLA adjustments work because they happen automatically. The Act applies similar logic to contribution rates.

The two-year trigger prevents overreaction to single-year fluctuations while allowing timely response to sustained imbalances. The bounds (1.10%-1.90% base; 2.20%-3.80% kicker) permit approximately 25 percent adjustment in either direction before requiring Congressional intervention, handling moderate fluctuations automatically while flagging extraordinary circumstances.

Separation from APSA¶

The strict separation between the Family Security Stabilization Account and the American Prosperity Contribution (funding APSA) is essential to both programs' political durability. The Act benefits children; APSA provides stability payments to adults. Commingling funds would invite attacks that "adult welfare" is taking money from children, or vice versa. Separate streams maintain clarity about who contributes what and who receives what from each program.

Addressing Concerns¶

"This Is a New Tax"¶

The Child Security Contribution is indeed a new levy. But the question is not whether it costs money -- all child benefits cost money. The question is whether dedicated funding is superior to general revenue funding. For the reasons discussed above, dedicated funding provides stability, creates stakeholder investment, and forces honest accounting that general revenue funding cannot match.

The contribution rate is modest. At 1.50 percent on all income, a median household earning approximately $75,000 contributes about $1,125 annually. This amount is roughly equivalent to four months of the enhanced benefit for a single child -- a favorable return on investment for families with children, and a reasonable contribution to shared national responsibility for families without.

"It Subsidizes Non-Work"¶

This concern rests on the assumption that adult behavior should determine child welfare. The Act rejects this premise. Children do not choose their parents' employment status and should not be punished for circumstances beyond their control.

Moreover, the empirical evidence does not support significant work disincentives from unconditional child benefits. International experience with child allowances shows minimal labor supply effects. The 2021 expanded credit produced no measurable reduction in employment. Work disincentive concerns are theoretically possible but empirically unsupported.

"The Automatic Adjustments Remove Congressional Control"¶

The automatic adjustment mechanism operates within bounds set by Congress and can be overridden by subsequent legislation at any time. Congress retains complete authority to modify rates, thresholds, or the mechanism itself. What the mechanism removes is the requirement for affirmative Congressional action to maintain program stability.

This distinction matters because Congressional inaction is the normal condition. Programs requiring regular legislative maintenance become vulnerable to unrelated political disputes, government shutdowns, and legislative bottlenecks. The automatic mechanism ensures the Act continues functioning even during periods of Congressional dysfunction.

"Birth Support Payments Will Increase Birth Rates Irresponsibly"¶

Empirical evidence consistently shows modest cash benefits have minimal effect on fertility decisions. People do not have children to collect $2,000 payments. They have children for complex personal, cultural, and relationship reasons, and financial considerations operate at a much larger scale than a one-time payment.

What the Birth Support Payment does affect is family financial stress during a vulnerable period. Reducing that stress improves maternal and infant health outcomes, reduces reliance on high-cost credit, and allows families to welcome new children without immediate financial crisis. These are the intended effects.

"Why Should Wealthy Families Receive Child Benefits?"¶

This is perhaps the most common objection to universal design. The intuition is powerful: surely families earning $500,000 don't "need" a $6,000 child benefit.

The Act's response has two parts:

First, the credit is for the child. A child born to wealthy parents did not choose those circumstances and is no less a child than one born into poverty. The principle that every child deserves support applies universally.

Second, wealthy families are massive net contributors to the program. A household earning $1,000,000 (joint) contributes $15,000 to the Child Security Contribution while receiving $6,000 for two children -- a net contribution of $9,000. At $2,000,000, the household contributes $60,000 and receives $6,000 -- a net contribution of $54,000. The program is deeply progressive even though every child receives the same benefit.

The "Bezos's child gets a check" objection evaporates when the full picture is visible: that family paid tens of thousands (or millions) into the system. The political optics of universal benefits with progressive funding are superior to targeted benefits that create "us versus them" divides.

Conclusion¶

The Act represents a deliberate architectural choice: to build child benefit policy on a foundation capable of bearing permanent weight. The combination of adequate benefits, universal contribution, and self-stabilizing funding mechanisms creates a structure that can endure political and economic cycles without constant reconstruction.

The design choices involve tradeoffs. A new contribution is more visible than general revenue funding. Full refundability extends benefits to families without earned income. Universal benefits without phase-out extend support to high-income families (who are net contributors). The automatic adjustment mechanism limits Congressional discretion. These tradeoffs were made deliberately, in service of the overriding goal: lasting investment in America's children.

The alternative is the status quo -- periodic expansions followed by expirations, political battles over child benefits every budget cycle, and outcomes that treat millions of children as acceptable casualties of political dysfunction. The Act offers a different path: a national commitment to child security, funded through shared responsibility, designed for permanence, and extended to every child equally because every child deserves no less.

Revision History¶

Revision 2.5 (Current) - Brought into compliance with APAI Document Production Standards Rev 1.6 - Updated header structure, footer, and revision history placement

Revision 2.4 - Updated to reflect elimination of income-based phase-out and universal benefit design - Added "Income-Based Phase-Out" to Alternatives Considered section - Revised "Why Should Wealthy Families Receive Child Benefits" in Addressing Concerns - Applied self-reference convention per APAI Section 1.7

Revision 2.0 - Initial publication

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Prepared by Albert Ramos for The American Policy Architecture Institute